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REDLIKING: WHEN REDLINING GOES ONLINE
ALLYSON E. GOLD*
ABSTRACT
Airbnb’s structure, design, and algorithm create a website archi-
tecture that allows user discrimination to prevent minority hosts
from realizing the same economic benefits from short-term rental
platforms as White hosts, a phenomenon this Article refers to as
“redliking.” For hosts with an unused home, a spare room, or an
extra couch, Airbnb provides an opportunity to create new income
streams and increase wealth. Airbnb encourages prospective guests
to view host photographs, names, and personal information when
considering potential accommodations, thereby inviting bias, both
implicit and overt, to permeate transactions. This bias has financial
consequences. Empirical research on host earning rates found that
White hosts earn significantly more than minorities, even when
controlling for location, size, and amenities. Airbnb’s algorithm
augments the effects and propensity of individual user bias, creating
a system wherein allegedly race-neutral variables serve as proxies for
discrimination. Contemporary redliking perpetuates historic in-
equality related to housing wealth. In the early twentieth century,
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redlining maps were used to justify withholding investments from
Black communities. Today, redliking continues the practice of direct-
ing wealth to White communities, reinforces systemic real property
barriers by depriving minority hosts of important revenue streams,
and exacerbates the racial wealth gap.
This Article examines the liability of Airbnb and similar websites
for discrimination experienced by minority short-term rental hosts.
The ability of the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act, laws
originally enacted to abolish housing discrimination and protect
minority consumers, to combat redliking is complicated by the fact
that sites such as Airbnb serve multiple purposes; while guests use
the platform to identify and book lodging, hosts use the site to
advertise available accommodations. Looking to judicial interpreta-
tion of platform liability in the context of online speech, this Article
proposes two approaches—a general-function test and a fragmented-
function test—to determine website liability for discrimination
against short-term rental hosts. Noting the limitations of the existing
antidiscrimination legal framework, this Article argues that
eradicating redliking requires incorporating lessons on platform
design from behavioral economics as well as eliminating opportuni-
ties for website algorithms to amplify and operationalize user
discrimination.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the average White family’s wealth was more than ten
times that of the average Black family.1 This racial wealth gap is
explained in part by access to capital in the form of real property. As
Professor William A. Darity Jr. stated, “[t]he origins of the racial
wealth gap start with the failure to provide the formerly enslaved
with the land grants of 40 acres.”2 Housing equity comprises nearly
“two-thirds of all wealth” for median households.3 For most families,
“the racial wealth gap is primarily a housing wealth gap.”4 Ameri-
can housing policy has created and perpetuated the housing wealth
gap. Federal and local policies prevented Black families and other
minorities from accessing housing wealth through a host of practices
working in concert, such as zoning, restrictive covenants, discrimi-
natory lending practices, and the creation of color-coded maps that
classified neighborhoods based on their perceived risk, with green
signifying the most desirable and red representing the least
desirable areas.5 “[A]reas with even a small black population were
1. See Nick Noel, Duwain Pinder, Shelley Stewart & Jason Wright, The Economic Impact
of Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, MCKINSEY & CO. (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.mckinsey.
com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/the-economic-impact-of-closing-the-racial-
wealth-gap# [https://perma.cc/QTH9-KRWE] (noting that the racial wealth gap increased from
$100,000 in 1992 to $154,000 in 2016); see also Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth Trends
in the United States, 1962 to 2016: Has Middle Class Wealth Recovered? 26-27, 42, 56 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24085, 2017), https://www.nber.org/system/files/
working_papers/w24085/w24085.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS9N-HEB8] (recalibrating all numbers
to represent 2016 dollars). American family wealth has increased dramatically over the last
half century. In 1962, the median American family had a net worth of $57,100; by 2007, that
number had more than doubled to $118,600. Id. at 42. Even in the aftermath of the Great
Recession, the median American family had a net worth of $78,100. Id. White families,
however, have disproportionately realized these gains. Id. at 56.
2. Trymaine Lee, A Vast Wealth Gap, Driven by Segregation, Redlining, Evictions and
Exclusion, Separates Black and White America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/racial-wealth-gap.html [https://perma.cc/C38U-
EJL9].
3. Janelle Jones, The Racial Wealth Gap: How African-Americans Have Been




5. Ian Appel & Jordan Nickerson, Pockets of Poverty: The Long-Term Effects of
Redlining 6-7 (Oct. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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generally given [the] lowest rating.”6 Based on these maps, the term
redlining became shorthand for “deeming certain neighborhoods as
‘hazardous’ and denying mortgages there as a matter of policy,
regardless of the applicant’s means.”7 Redlining baked racism into
the housing market, affecting the actions of individual actors. The
private market simultaneously reinforced these systemic barriers,
directing wealth to White neighborhoods and withholding it from
Black communities.8
Today, short-term rental platforms replicate historic redlining
practices by allowing discrimination to permeate online transac-
tions. Airbnb, the largest short-term rental provider in the world,
allows individual hosts to market available space—a spare room,
guest suite, or whole home—to prospective short-term guests.9
Airbnb uses photos of the space, as well as demographic information
about the host and guest, to facilitate the transaction on its plat-
form.10 Airbnb’s algorithm suggests potential accommodations based
on a number of factors, such as previous guest engagement with the
listing.11 Based on these recommendations, guests can decide to
book immediately or click an icon to “like” the listing and save it for
later consideration.12 Algorithms can uncover latent bias, which
results in a “supposedly neutral system” that, in actuality, opera-
tionalizes discrimination.13 Together, the user information included
on the platform combined with the algorithms that determine what
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852856 [https://perma.cc/9QQQ-52XN].
6. Id. at 7.
7. Eliza Wallace, Addressing Racial Inequality by Investigating Mortgage Denials,
POLICYMAP (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.policymap.com/2020/01/addressing-racial-inequality-
by-investigating-mortgage-denials/ [https://perma.cc/V4M5-WSWJ].
8. See Michela Zonta, Racial Disparities in Home Appreciation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(July 15, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/
15/469838/racial-disparities-home-appreciation/ [https://perma.cc/4XCL-NV4E].
9. What Is Airbnb? 12 Questions Answered on the World’s Fastest-Growing Holiday
Website, BT (Sept. 1, 2018, 3:38 PM), https://perma.cc/7JDD-L7CH.
10. See id.
11. How Airbnb Search Works, AIRBNB RES. CTR. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.airbnb.
com/resources/hosting-homes/a/how-airbnb-search-works-44#:~:text=Airbnb%20search
%20basics,to%20bookings%20in%20the%20past. [https://perma.cc/M82K-TA8W].
12. How Do I Manage My List of Saved Homes?, AIRBNB HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.
com/help/article/1236/how-do-i-manage-my-list-of-saved-homes [https://perma.cc/6NRT-SA7Y].
13. ALEX ROSENBLAT, UBERLAND: HOW ALGORITHMS ARE REWRITING THE RULES OF WORK
112-13 (2018).
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listings are displayed creates a system wherein more economic
opportunities are directed to White hosts.
The use of redlining maps in the early twentieth century prohib-
ited minorities from accumulating wealth and financial security
through homeownership by denying loans to Black neighborhoods
as well as excluding minority homeowners from purchasing in
White neighborhoods.14 Today, Airbnb’s structure, design, and algo-
rithm create a website architecture that allows user discrimination
to prevent minorities from realizing the same economic benefits
from short-term rental hosting, a phenomenon that this Article
refers to as redliking.
Airbnb has well-documented discrimination issues against guests
on its platform. Researchers found that “applications from guests
with distinctively African American names are 16 percent less likely
to be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively white
names.”15 The results were constant even when controlling for other
factors, including sex of the host, whether the property was shared
or unhosted, experience level of the host, diversity of the neighbor-
hood, and price of the listing.16 In recognition of this discrimination,
Airbnb changed its booking policy in October 2018 to no longer allow
hosts the opportunity to access guest photos before accepting a
request for accommodation.17
While Airbnb made some changes to its booking practices to limit
the ability of hosts to discriminate against guests, discrimination by
guests against hosts remains an issue. Discrimination against hosts
of color affects rates of booking and average asking rents on short-
term rental platforms.18 As documented in a Harvard Business
School study, non-Black hosts in New York City are able to charge
14. Appel & Nickerson, supra note 5, at 1-3.
15. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the
Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECONS. 1, 1-2
(2017) (“To test for discrimination, we conduct a field experiment in which we inquire about
the availability of roughly 6,400 listings on Airbnb across five cities. Specifically, we create
guest accounts that differ by name but are otherwise identical ... one distinctively African
American and the other distinctively white.”).
16. Id. at 2.
17. Update on Profile Photos, AIRBNB NEWSROOM (Oct. 22, 2018), https://news.airbnb.com/
update-on-profile-photos/ [https://perma.cc/7A44-99QV].
18. See Allyson E. Gold, Community Consequences of Airbnb, 94 WASH.L.REV. 1577, 1599
(2019).
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12 percent more than Black hosts, even when controlling for
location, accommodation characteristics, and quality.19 On average,
Black hosts received $107 per night for every $144 per night
received by non-Black hosts.20 Research on host earning rates in
Oakland and Berkeley, California, likewise found discrimination
against minority hosts, with Asian hosts earning 20 percent less
than White hosts.21
Discrimination against hosts has financial consequences. Short-
term rental platforms, such as Airbnb, provide hosts with the
opportunity to increase their income and wealth.22 This is accom-
plished through two channels. First, a host creates a new income
stream by listing a property on a short-term rental site.23 Second,
creating a new source of income increases the value of the underly-
ing real estate.24 Home-sharing on short-term rental platforms can
be transformative for individual hosts. By creating an additional
revenue source, home-sharing allows an individual to realize imme-
diate financial gains while simultaneously increasing the equity of
the core asset.25 Airbnb’s annual sales surpassed those of nearly all
hotels in 2018, including legacy companies such as Hilton, IHG, and
Hyatt.26 As Airbnb continues to grow, so too will the financial
benefits of hosting on the platform. However, without intervention,
19. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com
§ 1 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-
discrimination-the-case-of-airbnb-com [https://perma.cc/D5TK-V4L3]. The study was con-
ducted in 2014, prior to New York City’s regulation and the subsequent curtailing of Airbnb
listings. See Gold, supra note 18, at 1626.
20. Edelman & Luca, supra note 19, § 4.2.
21. David Wang, Stephen Xi & John Gilheany, The Model Minority? Not on Airbnb.com:
A Hedonic Pricing Model to Quantify Racial Bias Against Asian Americans, TECH. SCI. (Sept.
1, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015090104/ [https://perma.cc/DFD6-6B25].
22. Gold, supra note 18, at 1585-87. Further, depending on the jurisdiction, renters as well
as homeowners may be able to act as hosts on short-term rental platforms. See id. at 1608.
23. Id. at 1585 (noting, however, that “profitability ... can vary widely depending on its
location as well as the expenses unique to that property”).
24. Id. at 1585-87.
25. See id.
26. Only Marriott, the largest hotel chain in the world, surpassed Airbnb in 2018 sales.
Kate Gessner, Ahead of IPO, Airbnb’s Consumer Sales Surpass Most Hotel Brands, SECOND
MEASURE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://secondmeasure.com/datapoints/airbnb-sales-surpass-most-
hotel-brands/ [https://perma.cc/VF82-GAMT]; see Halah Touryalai, World’s Largest Hotels
2019: Marriott Leads Again, Hyatt & Accor Rise, FORBES (May 15, 2019, 5:50 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2019/05/15/worlds-largest-hotels-2019/#6588e977796d
[https://perma.cc/XW99-9MEV].
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redliking will perpetuate historic inequity related to housing,
thereby contributing to and exacerbating the racial wealth gap.
This Article examines legal recourse for minority hosts that
experience bias on short-term rental platforms. Other scholars have
studied the legal implications of discrimination against short-term
rental guests.27 Likewise, others have evaluated tort28 and consumer
law29 interventions to address the ways in which websites manipu-
late information about individual users. However, none have
analyzed how the design of short-term rental platforms allows for
discrimination against minority hosts, perpetuates the racial wealth
gap, and parallels historic housing equity discrimination. This
Article fills that gap.
In developing these points, this Article proceeds in four parts.
Part I defines the racial wealth gap and discusses the role of
housing discrimination in creating and exacerbating wealth in-
equality. It situates contemporary discrimination on short-term
rental platforms as a continuation of historic housing inequality,
focusing on early twentieth-century redlining practices. Part II
defines redliking—the infrastructure that permits discrimination
against minority hosts on short-term rental platforms—and how
this contemporary discrimination and its relationship to real
property parallel historic redlining practices. This Part describes the
importance of facilitating trust in online transactions and how this
creates opportunities for bias to infiltrate transactions. In doing so,
it examines the attendant financial consequences. Part III assesses
the ability of antidiscrimination law originally enacted to abolish
racist policies like redlining to combat contemporary redliking. This
Part begins by analyzing the applicability of the Fair Housing Act
and Civil Rights Act to guests who experience discrimination on
short-term rental platforms. It then distinguishes the services
Airbnb provides to guests from those it provides to hosts. In light of
the platform’s dual role, this Part proposes two approaches—a
general-function test and a fragmented-function test— to determine
27. See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1301 (2017); Norrinda Brown
Hayat, Accommodating Bias in the Sharing Economy, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 613, 614-16 (2018).
28. See Michal Lavi, Evil Nudges, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 4-5 (2018).
29. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1627-28, 1631 (2017).
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platform operator liability for discrimination against minority short-
term rental hosts under the Civil Rights Act. This Part also dis-
cusses remedies under state law. Recognizing the limitations of the
existing antidiscrimination legal framework, Part IV proposes
incorporating lessons from behavioral economics on choice architec-
ture as well as reform of the algorithms powering short-term rental
platforms to prevent face-neutral variables from serving as proxies
for discrimination against minority hosts.
I. THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP
The racial wealth gap refers to the “difference in wealth holdings
between the median household among populations grouped by race
or ethnicity.”30 According to the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), Black households have less than seven cents
of wealth for every dollar held by White households.31 White
households living near the poverty line typically have $18,000 in
wealth; however, similarly situated Black households typically have
zero wealth.32
These differences persist at the other end of the financial
spectrum. At the 99th percentile, the average Black family has
wealth of $1,575,000; the average White family in the 99th percen-
tile, in contrast, holds over $12 million.33 Black families and indi-
viduals comprise 13.4 percent of the entire U.S. population,34 yet
they own less than 3 percent of the country’s wealth.35 This has
30. LAURA SULLIVAN,TATJANA MESCHEDE,LARS DIETRICH,THOMAS SHAPIRO,AMY TRAUB,
CATHERINE RUETSCHLIN & TAMARA DRAUT, DEMOS, THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP: WHY POLICY
MATTERS 7 (2015), https://www.demos.org/research/racial-wealth-gap-why-policy-matters
[https://perma.cc/T2GB-5BY7].
31. WILLIAM DARITY JR., DARRICK HAMILTON, MARK PAUL, ALAN AJA, ANNE PRICE,
ANTONIO MOORE & CATERINA CHIOPRIS, SAMUEL DUBOIS COOK CTR. ON SOC. EQUITY, WHAT




33. Antonio Moore & Matt Bruenig, Without the Family Car Black Wealth Barely Exists,
PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2017/
09/30/without-the-family-car-black-wealth-barely-exists/ [https://perma.cc/GXU4-C6TR].
34. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/
PST045218 [https://perma.cc/T3YH-G9YR].
35. DARITY ET AL., supra note 31, at 3.
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significant effects on intergenerational wealth accumulation. One
of the primary ways that wealth is accumulated and transferred is
through inheritance.36 In general, “financial gifts from parents to
adult children comprise at least 20 percent of wealth, and inheri-
tances account for up to 50 percent of total wealth in the United
States.”37 If Black American families hold significantly less wealth
than their White counterparts, there is less wealth to pass to their
beneficiaries, which perpetuates wealth inequality in subsequent
generations.38
Analysis of wealth accumulation between 1983 and 2013 under-
scores the magnitude of racial wealth disparities in the United
States. During that time, average White family wealth grew by 84
percent, or 1.2 times greater than the rate of wealth growth for
Latinos and three times the rate of wealth growth for Black indi-
viduals and families.39 If wealth continues to accumulate along
racial lines at the same rates of growth, “it would take Black
families 228 years to amass the same amount of wealth White
families have today.”40 The effects of wealth compound over time.
Wealth can be leveraged to provide for educational opportunities,
pay for family health needs, and weather economic hardship.41 For
example, “[f]amily wealth is an important predictor of both college
36. Id. (“While income primarily is earned in the labor market, wealth is built primarily
by the transfer of resources across generations, locking-in the deep divides we observe across
racial groups.”); Nancy A. Denton, The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and
Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1199 (2001).
37. Tatjana Meschede, Joanna Taylor, Alexis Mann & Thomas Shapiro, “Family
Achievements?”: How a College Degree Accumulates Wealth for Whites and Not for Blacks, 99
FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 121, 124 (2017); see Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The
Inheritance of Inequality, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 4 (2002) (“[R]ecent research shows that the
[previous] estimates of high levels of intergenerational mobility were artifacts of two types
of measurement error: mistakes in reporting income, particularly when individuals were
asked to recall the income of their parents, and transitory components in current income
uncorrelated with underlying permanent income.”).
38. See Meschede et al., supra note 37, at 124-25 (“White households are more likely to
receive inheritances and financial gifts than their counterparts of color ... and in larger
amounts.” (citation omitted)).
39. DEDRICK ASANTE-MUHAMMED, CHUCK COLLINS, JOSH HOXIE & EMANUEL NIEVES, THE
EVER-GROWING GAP: WITHOUT CHANGE, AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND LATINO FAMILIES WON’T
MATCH WHITE WEALTH FOR CENTURIES 5 (2016), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/
08/The-Ever-Growing-Gap-CFED_IPS-Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEL4-TB35].
40. Id.
41. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth
Accumulation, 39 J. HUM. RES. 193, 194 (2004).
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attendance and college completion.”42 Reflecting this, status is com-
monly a multigenerational trait; unlike income, parents can transfer
wealth to their children via planning documents or even intestate
succession.43 For these reasons, parental economic status is typically
replicated and entrenched in future generations.44
A. Housing and Wealth Accumulation
For many, home acquisition and appreciation are crucial compo-
nents of personal wealth. According to the Harvard University Joint
Center for Housing Studies, five factors underlie the relationship
between homeownership and wealth: forced savings through mort-
gage amortization, asset appreciation over time, receiving the
benefit of leveraged financing, tax benefits, and hedging against
inflation.45 In addition, homeowners may have the ability to increase
their income and wealth by making real property available on short-
term rental platforms.46 This is accomplished through two channels.
First, a homeowner-host creates a new income stream by listing a
42. Meschede et al., supra note 37, at 122-23 (“[T]he racial wealth gap plays a significant
role in the opportunities and barriers young people of color face. White students may
capitalize on family resources to launch stable careers and continue wealth accumulation,
while Black students may start out with fewer resources, resulting in lower long-term wealth
returns.... [S]tudents whose families experienced an increase in housing wealth just before
reaching college age are more likely to enroll in college, attend higher-quality universities,
and complete college, particularly students from low-income families. Black families have
lower homeownership rates, lower average home values, and were hit harder by the imme-
diate and long-term impacts of the Great Recession, making it harder for them to use housing
wealth to support higher education.” (citations omitted)).
43. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 179 (2017).
44. Id.; MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:ANEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 36-37 (1995) (“The major reason that blacks and whites
differ in their ability to accumulate wealth is ... that the structure of investment opportunity
that blacks and whites face has been dramatically different.”).
45. Christopher E. Herbert, Daniel T. McCue & Rocio Sanchez-Moyano, Is
Homeownership Still an Effective Means of Building Wealth for Low-Income and Minority
Households? (Was It Ever?) 3-5 (2013) (on file with the Harvard University Joint Center for
Housing Studies), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/hbtl-06.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZBV3-7MEK].
46. See Gold, supra note 18, at 1579-80. The degree to which a homeowner can earn
additional income and increase the property value of her holding will depend on regulations
governing the realty in that particular area. Further, depending on the jurisdiction, renters
as well as homeowners may be able to act as hosts on short-term rental platforms. See id. at
1604-05, 1608.
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property on a short-term rental site.47 Second, creating a new source
of income increases the value of the underlying real estate.48 The
importance of real estate to the racial wealth gap is the result of
more than a century’s worth of government policies and private
sector action.
1. Redlining and Historic Housing Equity Discrimination
While a full history of housing inequality is beyond the scope of
this Article,49 a brief summary provides the context necessary to
understand how the issue of discrimination on short-term rental
platforms perpetuates historic inequality and why it is relevant
when examining contemporary legal frameworks. “Individual
prejudice has been with us for generations, but as the Commission
on Race and Housing pointed out some years ago: ‘It is the real
estate brokers, builders, and the mortgage finance institutions
which translate prejudice into discriminatory action.’”50 The federal
government had an active role in creating, facilitating, and promot-
ing housing discrimination. In 1933, in response to a massive
economic downturn that resulted in widespread foreclosure, the
federal government created the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
(HOLC).51 HOLC did a number of things to stabilize the housing
market. First, it helped homeowners avoid default by refinancing
47. Id. at 1580, 1585 (“[A]s the home’s potential to generate additional income rises, its
total value as an asset grows, leading to increased home equity for the host....[However, the] 
profitability of an individual short-term rental can vary widely depending on its location as
well as the expenses unique to that property.”).
48. Id. at 1580. While not the focus of this Section, it is important to note that renters are
often prevented from realizing economic gains created by short-term rental hosting. In some
jurisdictions, participation in short-term rental markets is limited to homeowners. In West
Hollywood, California, for example, “homesharing is prohibited in ... ‘any rental unit.’” Id. at
1619 (quoting WEST HOLLYWOOD, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.66.020 (2019)). This itself affects
the racial wealth gap, as decades of discriminatory practices affecting access to home-
ownership opportunities have resulted in minorities being over-represented among renters.
49. For a detailed history of housing discrimination in the United States, see generally
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43.
50. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., UNDERSTANDING FAIR HOUSING, 3, 5 (1973) (“The housing
industry, aided and abetted by Government, must bear the primary responsibility for the
legacy of segregated housing.... Government and private industry came together to create a
system of residential segregation.”).
51. Gregory Sharp & Matthew Hall, Emerging Forms of Racial Inequality in Home-
ownership Exit, 1968-2009, 61 SOC. PROBS. 427, 428 (2014).
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their mortgages and also provided low-interest loans to prospective
homebuyers, many of whom had already lost their homes to fore-
closure in the Great Depression and needed replacement housing.52
Second, HOLC pioneered an appraisal system “to evaluate the risks
associated with loans made to specific urban neighborhoods.”53
HOLC used four categories to rate neighborhoods, with ethnic and
minority neighborhoods designated in red, the lowest category.54
Invariably, Black neighborhoods, “even those with small black
percentages,” were placed in the red, a practice referred to as
redlining.55 “HOLC did not invent these standards of racial worth in
real estate—they were already well established by the 1920s—it
bureaucratized them and applied them on an exceptional scale[,] ...
len[ding] the power, prestige, and support of the federal government
to the systematic practice of racial discrimination in housing.”56
52. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51 (1993) (“HOLC was the first government-sponsored
program to introduce, on a mass scale, the use of long-term, self-amortizing mortgages with
uniform payments.”); see also PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS
AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 59 (2013) (“The HOLC was created as
a means to provide low-interest refinancing to families in danger of losing their homes during
the Depression, while also funding loans to allow some families to reacquire homes lost to
foreclosure.”).
53. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 52, at 51.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 52 (“HOLC underwriters were far more concerned about the location and
movement of blacks than about any other demographic trend.... [A] confidential 1941 HOLC
survey of real estate prospects in the St. Louis area ... repeatedly mentions ‘the rapidly
increasing Negro population’ and the consequent ‘problem in the maintenance of real estate
values.’”).
56. Id.
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Figure 1. Redlined Map of New Orleans with Neighborhoods
Color-Coded by Alleged Risk Level57
HOLC’s redlining maps were adopted by the nascent Federal
Housing Administration (FHA). Formed in 1934, the FHA was
instrumental in increasing homeownership rates in the United
States by expanding access to mortgages.58 As part of its mortgage
underwriting/backing service, the FHA provided home appraisals
while using an Underwriting Manual. The first Manual instructed
appraisers that “[i]f a neighborhood is to retain stability it is
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes. A change in social or racial occupancy
57. Robert K. Nelson et al., Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America,
AMERICAN PANORAMA:ANATLAS OF U.S.HIST., https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/
#loc=5/39.1/-94.58  [https://perma.cc/T7WQ-8JNA] (this map was developed by teams at the
University of Richmond,Virginia Tech, the University of Maryland, and Johns Hopkins, as
well as with the assistance of others at UNC Chapel Hill, UC Irvine, Duke, and UC San
Diego).
58. Sharp & Hall, supra note 51, at 428.
2021] REDLIKING: WHEN REDLINING GOES ONLINE 1855
generally contributes to instability and a decline in values.”59 “All
mortgages on properties protected against [such] unfavorable
influences, to the extent protection is possible, will obtain a high
rating.”60
In addition to adopting HOLC’s redlining maps, the FHA
endorsed racially restrictive covenants in real-estate contracts
between private parties,61 as a means of ensuring the racial stability
of the neighborhood;62 racially restrictive covenants worked in con-
cert with redlining to ensure that no minorities could enter, and
impair the ratings of, White neighborhoods. This continued until the
practice was declared unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer.63
Realizing that minority families, particularly Black families,
continued to experience persistent discrimination and “the prevail-
ing patterns of racial segregation,”64 Congress passed the Fair
59. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND VALUATION
PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT ¶ 937 (1938), https://www.hud
user.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Federal-Housing-Administration-Underwriting-Manual.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CM99-49XP].
60. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 65 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. HOUS.
ADMIN., supra note 59).
61. Sharp & Hall, supra note 51, at 428.
62. SHARKEY, supra note 52, at 60 (“The FHA manuals actually encouraged the use of
restrictive covenants as a means of ensuring the stability of the neighborhood. As a
consequence, the home ownership boom never reached nonwhite populations in America’s
cities.” (footnote omitted)).
63. 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948) (“We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the
restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal protection
of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand. We have noted that
freedom from discrimination by the States in the enjoyment of property rights was among the
basic objectives sought to be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
such discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear. Because of the race or color of these
petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of
course by other citizens of different race or color.”); see also FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR
HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 212-13
(John F. Bauman, Roger Biles & Kristin M. Szylvian eds., 2000). Despite the fact that Shelley
was decided in 1948, “[i]n substance, the [Federal Housing Administration] agreed to render
ineligible for mortgage insurance all property bound by racially restrictive covenants recorded
after February 15, 1950.... The intent ... was ‘to bring the mortgage insurance operations of
the [FHA] fully into line with the policy underlying the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
... in the covenant cases.’” Id.
64. U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, KERNER REPORT 1, 29 (Princeton
Univ. Press 2016) (1968) (declaring that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one
black, one white—separate and unequal”); see also SHARKEY, supra note 52, at 53 (describing
how President Johnson assembled the Kerner Commission “to investigate the causes of the
urban riots that ripped through America’s cities over the previous summer,” and how the
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Housing Act in 1968.65 Under the law, discrimination in the sale and
rental of housing, mortgage lending, and other practices was
prohibited.66
After World War II, the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act provided
returning servicemen with a host of benefits, including mortgage
guarantees, through the newly created Veterans’ Administration
(VA).67 The VA quickly adopted the FHA’s Underwriting Manual in
its own appraisals and lending decisions.68 “By 1950, the FHA and
VA together were insuring half of all new mortgages nationwide.”69
Given the ubiquity of redlining maps, minority homebuyers were
excluded from government programs created to help the new
burgeoning middle class acquire equity and wealth. Redlining made
Black borrowers ineligible for home loans in Black neighborhoods
and also prevented them from entering White neighborhoods, which
concentrated minority populations within distinct geographic areas.
Entrenched and pervasive segregation following this period was “the
direct result of an unprecedented collaboration between local and
national government.”70
2. Housing Discrimination and the Racial Wealth Gap 
The racial wealth gap is in part explained by access to capital in
the form of real property. Home equity is the largest asset for most
Commission “recommended both fair housing legislation and an active policy to promote the
construction of affordable housing outside of the ghetto”).
65. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3601).
66. Housing Discrimination Under the Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/fair_housing_act_over
view#_What_Is_Prohibited? [https://perma.cc/QG3G-E3VW].
67. Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 101). Minorities were
excluded from and women were unable to access FHA benefits from the VA. Florence Wagman
Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious Deficiencies of the United States’ Housing
Programs for Veterans and the “Public Scandal” of Veterans’ Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REV.
103, 147-50 (2005) (“The relative inability of women to use the housing program was due to
several causes.... Many women who served in various units associated with the military were
not accorded veteran status.... Moreover, even women who were accorded veteran status were
less likely than men to secure benefits counseling from veterans’ organizations and were, for
other reasons, less likely to claim veterans’ status.”).
68. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 70.
69. Id.
70. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 52, at 57.
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families.71 Housing equity comprises nearly two-thirds of all wealth
for most median households.72 For most families, “the racial wealth
gap is primarily a housing wealth gap.”73 “This enormous difference
in (wealth) is almost entirely attributable to federal housing policy
implemented through the 20th century.”74
Policies and laws that prevented Black families “from acquiring
land, created redlining and restrictive covenants, and encouraged
lending discrimination reinforced the racial wealth gap for
decades.”75 Real estate discrimination and its resulting segregation,
coupled with “systematic disinvestment in black neighborhoods
through lending discrimination” prevented Black families from ob-
taining homes and accumulating wealth “during the long, postwar
economic boom.”76 The effects of these policies affected individuals
and families in subsequent generations. “African American families
today, whose parents and grandparents were denied participation
in the equity-accumulating boom of the 1950s and 1960s, have great
difficulty catching up now.”77 Moreover, even after legislation, such
as the Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act, prohibited it, housing
71. THOMAS SHAPIRO, TATJANA MESCHEDE & SAM OSORO, INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y,
THE ROOTS OF THE WIDENING RACIAL WEALTH GAP: EXPLAINING THE BLACK-WHITE ECONOMIC
DIVIDE 3 (2013), https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/racial-wealth-equity/racial-wealth-gap/
roots-widening-racial-wealth-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/YK6H-C3QR] (“Homes are the largest
investment that most American families make and by far the biggest item in their wealth
portfolio.”). See generally Gittleman & Wolff, supra note 41.
72. LAWRENCE MISHEL, JOSH BIVENS, ELISE GOULD & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, THE STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA 393 (12th ed. 2012) (“While stock market fluctuations garner much
attention, housing equity is a far more important form of wealth for most households.”).
73. Jones, supra note 3; Meghan Kuebler & Jacob S. Rugh, New Evidence on Racial and
Ethnic Disparities in Homeownership in the United States from 2001 to 2010, 42 SOC. SCI.
RSCH. 1357, 1358 (2013) (“Even after controlling for socioeconomic differences, in most cases
minorities in the U.S. exhibit lower levels of homeownership than do non-Hispanic whites.
Owing largely to the white/nonwhite gap in homeownership, substantial racial and ethnic
differences in wealth persist across numerous studies and periods. Disparities in wealth and
capital accumulation have been historically tied to racial disparities in homeownership and
have reinforced one another.” (citations omitted)).
74. Pedro da Costa, Housing Discrimination Underpins the Staggering Wealth Gap
Between Blacks and Whites, ECON.POL’Y INST. (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:00 AM) (alteration in original),
https://www.epi.org/blog/housing-discrimination-underpins-the-staggering-wealth-gap-
between-blacks-and-whites/ [https://perma.cc/SB3Z-FP84].
75. Jones, supra note 3.
76. Justin P. Steil, Len Albright, Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, The Social
Structure of Mortgage Discrimination, 33 HOUS. STUD. 759, 761 (2018).
77. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 185.
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discrimination and segregation persisted and contributed to the
racial wealth gap.78 For example, in the decade leading up to the
Great Recession, Black and Latino borrowers disproportionately
received “high-cost, high-risk mortgages that later pushed borrow-
ers into foreclosure and repossession.”79
The effects of discriminatory housing policies and practices com-
pound over time. Analysis of American household wealth between
1984 and 2009—a period of twenty-five years—found that
homeownership accounted for 27 percent of the difference in relative
wealth growth between Black and White families during that time.80
Given the importance of homeownership and equity to wealth accu-
mulation, it is very difficult for Black families that were excluded
from the mid-twentieth-century housing equity boom to close the
racial wealth gap.81
B. Short-Term Rental Platforms and Wealth Accumulation
Short-term rental platforms are online websites that connect
hosts, those with an interest in a property, with prospective guests,
those seeking temporary accommodations. While there are several
such platforms, including Homeaway, VRBO, Flipkey, and Noirbnb,
none have a greater market share than Airbnb. Founded in 2008 in
San Francisco,82 today Airbnb boasts hosts in more than 220
countries and regions around the world.83 Sales on Airbnb have
grown exponentially since its founding in 2008.84 In 2018, Airbnb
78. See Steil et al., supra note 76, at 761.
79. Id. at 772.
80. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 71, at 2-3; see also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 184-85
(“Median white family income is now about $60,000, while median black family income is
about $37,000—about 60 percent as much. You might expect that the ratio of black to white
household wealth would be similar. But median white household wealth ... is about $134,000,
while median black household wealth is about $11,000—less than 10 percent as much. Not
all of this enormous difference is attributable to the government’s racial housing policy, but
a good portion of it certainly is.”).
81. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 185.
82. What Is Airbnb and How Does It Work?, AIRBNB: HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/
help/article/2503/what-is-airbnb-and-how-does-it-work [https://perma.cc/UWB6-2R5D].
83. About Us, AIRBNB NEWSROOM, https://news.airbnb.com/en-in/about-us/ [https://perma.
cc/CS23-4R2V].
84. Rani Molla, American Consumers Spent More on Airbnb than on Hilton Last Year, VOX
(Mar. 25, 2019, 8:17 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/3/25/18276296/airbnb-hotels-hilton-
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sales surpassed that of legacy hotel companies including Hilton,
IHG, Hyatt, and Wyndham, among others.85 Only Marriott, “the
world’s largest hotel company,” had greater sales in 2018.86 With
this growth, Airbnb clinched nearly 20 percent of the U.S. consumer
lodging market.87
On Airbnb, anyone can be a host, and it is free to sign up and list
your space.88 Once a host publishes a listing on the platform, guests
can request to book the accommodation. Hosts control the nightly
rates for their listings and can create custom pricing for certain
days, weeks, or times of the year.89 The guest pays money to Airbnb,
which then releases payout to the host roughly twenty-four hours
after the guest’s scheduled check-in time.90
Property owners who elect to become hosts on short-term rental
sites have the opportunity to increase their wealth through multiple
channels. First, participation in the short-term rental market
creates a new income stream.91 The net profitability of an individual
listing will vary depending on underlying costs associated with the
property, such as rent or mortgage, utilities, and capital expenses.92
However, the average Airbnb host earns 81 percent of the rent by
listing one bedroom of a two-bedroom property on Airbnb.93 While
profitability may vary, studies suggest that listing a home on the
short-term rental market can be more profitable than the more
marriott-us-spending [https://perma.cc/Z8SJ-KG58] (“The data shows roughly 30 percent
growth [in 2018] in US consumer spending on Airbnb.”).
85. Gessner, supra note 26 (“[Airbnb’s] annual sales surpassed Hilton’s in 2018, based on
data from U.S. travelers that excludes business spending.”).
86. Molla, supra note 84.
87. Gessner, supra note 26 (“Airbnb held 19 percent of market share nationwide amongst
the biggest hotel chains and HomeAway, [though] its performance varied widely by state.”).
88. What Is Airbnb and How Does It Work?, supra note 82.
89. How Do I Set a Custom Price for Specific Nights, Weeks, or Months?, AIRBNB HELP
CTR., https:// www.airbnb.com/help/article/503/how-do-i-set-a-custom-price-for-specific-nights-
weeks-or-months [https://perma.cc/M6AH-LFCS].
90. When Will I Get My Payout?, AIRBNB HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/
425/when-will-i-get-my-payout [https://perma.cc/5WB9-JLVQ].
91. Gold, supra note 18, at 1585.
92. Id. at 1585-86.
93. Nick Wallace, Where Do Airbnb Hosts Make the Most Money?, SMARTASSET (Feb. 20,
2018), https://smartasset.com/mortgage/where-do-airbnb-hosts-make-the-most-money [https://
perma.cc/H4D4-KNFG] (“First, we calculated expected revenue of private-room Airbnb rentals
in each city.... Then, we calculated expected net profits (after average rent, utilities and
internet) for full-home rentals in each city.”).
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traditional, long-term rental market. A study of Airbnb listings in
New York City found that “hosts of frequently rented entire-home
Airbnb listings earn 200% or more [than] the median long-term
neighborhood rent.”94
Second, by creating a new income stream, property owners can
increase the value of the underlying assets.95 The opportunity to
increase wealth through participation in the short-term rental
market is “likely quite skewed to those with more wealth” in the
first place.96 Housing wealth is “concentrated among white and
high-income households.”97 According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
the homeownership rate among White households is nearly 30
percent higher than among Black households.98 Moreover, “it is
likely that much of the benefit of Airbnb’s introduction and expan-
sion accrues to those with more than one property (one for occupying
and one or more for renting).”99 Indeed, a significant portion of
94. DAVID WACHSMUTH,DAVID CHANEY, DANIELLE KERRIGAN, ANDREA SHILLOLO & ROBIN
BASALAEV-BINDER, THE HIGH COST OF SHORT-TERM RENTALS IN NEW YORK CITY 34 (2018),
http://www.sharebetter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/High-Cost-Short-Term-Rentals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9T2-NV38]. This study was conducted before New York City enacted
legislation curtailing the ability to use properties as short-term rental accommodations. See
Gold, supra note 18, at 1626.
95. Gold, supra note 18, at 1585; see also The Appraisal Process, PICKENSASSESOR, https://
pickensassessor.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/2018/07/Appraisal-Process.pdf [https://perma.
cc/WP6Y-FY5A] (stating that the income approach to real estate valuation expressly looks to
income generated by the property to determine its fair market value).
96. JOSH BIVENS, THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIRBNB: NO REASON FOR LOCAL
POLICYMAKERS TO LET AIRBNB BYPASS TAX OR REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS 6 (2019), https://
www.epi.org/publication/the-economic-costs-and-benefits-of-airbnb-no-reason-for-local-policy
makers-to-let-airbnb-bypass-tax-or-regulatory-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/QJ34-X2LM] (“If
the only barrier to renting out residential property to short-term visitors were the associated
transaction costs, then in theory the creation and expansion of Airbnb could be reducing these
transaction costs and making short-term rental options more viable. It does seem intuitive
that transaction costs of screening and booking short-term renters would be higher over the
course of a year than such costs for renting to long-term residents (or the costs of maintaining
owner-occupied property). However, the potential benefits are only the difference between
what the property owner earned before the introduction of Airbnb and what the property
owners earned from short-term rentals booked through the Airbnb platform.”). 
97. Id.
98. See U.S.CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP,
FOURTH QUARTER 2019 (2020), https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/qtr419/Q419press.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3B5L-UGEE] (“[T]he fourth quarter 2019 homeownership rate for non-
Hispanic White Alone householders reporting a single race was highest at 73.7 percent....
Black Alone householders was lowest at 44.0 percent.”).
99. BIVENS, supra note 96, at 6 (“The distribution of property wealth generated by
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Airbnb hosts operate more than one listing. Analysis of Austin,
Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. found that
the portion of the Airbnb market held by hosts with more than one
listing ranged from 30 percent (Austin) to 44 percent (Boston).100
Given the relationship between historic housing discrimination,
contemporary homeownership rates,101 and the housing wealth gap,
it is likely that the majority of property owners who benefit from the
growing short-term rental market are White. White homeowners
continue to profit and accumulate wealth based on their advantage
built on racist policies instituted and perpetuated decades ago.
II. UNDERSTANDING REDLIKING: CONSUMER DISCRIMINATION ON
SHORT-TERM RENTAL PLATFORMS
It is well established that consumers can discriminate “in every
step of a ... transaction.”102 Empirical research has identified
discrimination in giving taxicab gratuities,103 acquiring rental
nonprimary residential real estate is even more concentrated than housing wealth overall.”).
100. Jake Wegmann & Junfeng Jiao, Taming Airbnb: Toward Guiding Principles for Local
Regulation of Urban Vacation Rentals Based on Empirical Results from Five US Cities, 69
LAND USE POL’Y 494, 496-98 (2017) (“The data analyzed in this paper was obtained from
‘scrapes’ of Airbnb’s website conducted by New York-based photojournalist and data analyst
Murray Cox.... Data for each of the five cities was collected in the late spring or early summer
of 2015.”). Of the remaining cities, Chicago’s share was 38 percent, San Francisco’s share was
34 percent, and Washington, D.C.’s share was 39 percent. Id. at 498. The analysis was con-
ducted in 2015, before San Francisco enacted new laws regulating short-term rentals. For
more information on changes to San Francisco’s short-term rental regulation, see Gold, supra
note 18, at 1623-24.
101. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 98.
102. Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV.
223, 224 (2016).
103. E.g., Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars & Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial
Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1616 (2005) (finding “African-American
cab drivers on average were tipped approximately one-third less than white cab drivers”).
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housing,104 and purchasing a new car,105 among other transac-
tions.106
The shift of consumer transactions to online platforms allows
other forms of consumer discrimination to be observed through
empirical research.107 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the data show that
consumers also discriminate when transacting online. A study of
eBay transactions found that when a Black hand held baseball
cards, they sold for 20 percent less than when a White hand held
baseball cards.108 Similarly, a study of online advertisements for
104. E.g., John Yinger, Evidence on Discrimination in Consumer Markets, 12 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 23, 31 (1998) (stating that, based on the landmark Housing Discrimination Study
conducted by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), “black
renters faced a 10.7 percent chance of being excluded altogether from housing made available
to comparable white renters and a 23.5 percent chance of learning about fewer apartments”);
see also SHARKEY, supra note 52, at 54 (noting that HUD’s 2000 Housing Discrimination
Study found that “in 17 to 25 percent of cases African Americans and Latinos are ‘consistently’
treated unfavorably when compared with their white counterparts”).
105. E.g., Peter Siegelman, Racial Discrimination in “Everyday” Commercial Transactions:
What Do We Know, What Do We Need to Know, and How Can We Find Out?, in A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING 69, 72-73 (Michael Fix
& Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998), https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.
1.1.923.8761&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/39KA-QLPJ] (finding that “white male
testers were able to negotiate an average final markup of roughly $560, while white females
were quoted a final price that was roughly $130 higher than this.... Black testers in our study
negotiated final offers that were much higher than their white male counterparts. Black
female testers were asked to pay an additional $400, and black males an additional $1,060
over what white males were quoted for similar cars at the identical dealerships”).
106. See, e.g., John M. Nunley, Adam Pugh, Nicholas Romero & Richard Alan Seals, Jr.,
An Examination of Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market for Recent College Graduates:
Estimates from the Field (Auburn Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper Series 2014-06, 2014),
https://cla.auburn.edu/econwp/archives/2014/2014-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWH7-LEUJ]
(“Online job advertisements were answered with over 9,000 résumés from fictitious, recently-
graduated job seekers. We find strong evidence of differential treatment by race.”).
107. See Alex Rosenblat, Karen E.C. Levy, Solon Barocas & Tim Hwang, Discriminating
Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Workplace Discrimination, 9 POL’Y &
INTERNET 256, 263 (2017) (“[Online] platforms offer a convenient way to conduct field
experiments.”). See generally Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo, Field Experiments on
Discrimination 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22014, 2016), https://www.
nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22014/w22014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HJN-WBP2]
(providing a detailed overview of “existing field experimentation literature on the prevalence
of discrimination, the consequences of such discrimination, and possible approaches to
undermine it”). Regarding internet-based transactions, Bertrand and Duflo note that “[t]he
expansion of online platforms allows researchers to use the correspondence method to also
study discrimination in retail markets.” Id. at 22.
108. Ian Ayres, Mahzarin Banaji & Christine Jolls, Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J.ECON.
891, 910 (2015) (“Baseball cards we auctioned on eBay sold for significantly less when held
2021] REDLIKING: WHEN REDLINING GOES ONLINE 1863
iPods found that when the device was displayed in a Black hand,
the advertisement received “13% fewer responses and 18% fewer
offers” than when displayed in a White hand.109 Online purchasers
were 17 percent less likely to put their names in emails, 44 percent
less likely to accept mail delivery, and 56 percent more likely to be
concerned about long-distance payments when buying from Black
sellers.110 Minority Uber drivers receive lower ratings than their
White counterparts.111
Studies of online transactions highlight how the availability of
demographic information can lead to discriminatory outcomes for
minority users.112 Underscoring this finding, the absence of demo-
graphic information leads to more equitable results. In in-person car
sales, when demographic information is readily available, Black and
Hispanic buyers pay a markup that is 30 percent higher than the
by an African-American hand than when held by a Caucasian hand. A simple auction market
(eBay) appears to produce disproportionately negative outcomes for African-Americans even
when there is no opportunity to observe demeanor, socioeconomic status, or other nonrace but
potentially race-correlated features of potential transaction partners.”).
109. Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market
Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469, F490 (2013).
110. Id. at F490-91.
111. See ROSENBLAT, supra note 13, at 113.
112. Discrimination is not unique to platforms that facilitate the sale of goods and services.
In a 2014 study of race and attraction, OkCupid co-founder Christian Rudder wrote that
African-American women and Asian men were rated as less attractive than their peers.
Ashley Brown, ‘Least Desirable’? How Racial Discrimination Plays Out in Online Dating, NPR
(Jan. 9, 2018, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/09/575352051/least-desirable-how-racial-
discrimination-plays-out-in-online-dating [https://perma.cc/FHB6-TXRN]. In response,
OkCupid executives consulted with social scientists to better understand how and why
discrimination is perpetuated on their platform. Id. Noting the relationship between real-life
familiarity and online practices, OkCupid’s Chief Marketing Officer said, “[When it comes to
attraction,] familiarity is a really big piece ... [s]o people tend to be often attracted to the
people that they are familiar with. And in a segregated society, that can be harder in certain
areas than in others.” Id. (first alteration in original); see also Jevan A. Hutson, Jessie G. Taft,
Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Debiasing Desire: Addressing Bias & Discrimination on Intimate
Platforms, 2 PROC. ACM HUM.—COMPUT. INTERACTION 73, 73:3 (2018) (“The intimate realm
represents one of the only remaining domains in which individuals may feel entitled to
express explicit preferences along lines of race and disability. Even describing such
preferences as biased or discriminatory can be challenging. As a matter of personal
preference, sexual attraction might seem definitionally discriminatory: to have any preference
is to favor some people, and disfavor others, as potential partners. But describing desire as
discriminatory is a way to capture more than the mere fact of sexual preference; it is a way
to recognize and name intimate affinities that emerge from histories of subjugation and
segregation.” (footnote omitted)).
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price paid by White buyers.113 In contrast, a study of online car sales
in which the buyer’s demographic information was hidden from the
seller found that “the Internet eliminates most variation in new car
prices that results from individual characteristics associated with
race and ethnicity.”114 When demographic information was withheld
from the seller, minority buyers paid the same prices as their White
counterparts in online transactions, even when controlling for in-
come, education, and search costs.115
Short-term rental platforms such as Airbnb are not immune from
discrimination carried out by users. To understand how discrimina-
tion occurs on such platforms, an overview of Airbnb’s booking
policy is instructive. Airbnb divides its users into two categories: (1)
guests and (2) hosts.116 All users are required by the website to
share photographs and personal information, including name, likes
and dislikes, and hobbies, among others.117 Once a prospective guest
searches a destination for potential accommodations, Airbnb’s
algorithm will populate available listings in the results. A guest can
then click on available listings to obtain additional information
about the amenities, view photographs of the property, and learn
the identity of the host. The host’s name and photograph automati-
cally appear at the top of the page, directly adjacent to the name of
the listing. The prospective guest can click on the photograph to
learn more about the host. The guest can decide to book immedi-
ately or click the heart icon to “like” the listing and save it for later
consideration.118
113. Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer & Jorge Silva-Risso, Consumer Information
and Price Discrimination: Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and
Minorities? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 8668, 2001), https://www.nber.
org/papers/w8668.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK8M-A47Z]. The study notes that “about 65% of the
minority price premium can be attributed to observable individual differences in income,
education, and search costs.” Id.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id.
116. What Is Airbnb and How Does It Work?, supra note 82.
117. Why Do I Need to Have an Airbnb Profile?, AIRBNB HELPCTR., https://airbnb.com/help/
article/67/why-do-i-need-to-have-an-airbnb-profile [https://perma.cc/V2RK-MU3F].
118. This allows users “to keep track of listings [they] like.” See How Do I Manage My List
of Saved Homes?, supra note 12.
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This Part discusses the need to create trust in online commercial
exchanges, the relationship between that need and discrimination,
and the economic consequences of consumer discrimination.
A. Facilitating Trust Online
Transactions are predicated on establishing trusting relationships
between the parties. Trust involves “a subjective belief that one
party (the trustee) will behave in a [certain] manner which is in the
interest of another party (the trustor) within a transaction.”119
Transactions in the traditional, brick-and-mortar market
typically include a face-to-face interaction (for example, a buyer
entering a shop and purchasing goods and services directly from a
seller). In contrast, sharing economy parties never meet in person
nor do buyers have the opportunity to “squeeze the oranges” before
committing to the purchase.120 Moreover, transactions in brick-and-
mortar establishments are understood to be regulated by relevant
laws and policies, thereby protecting the parties from harm or injury
that may occur. To overcome hesitation surrounding perceived—and
real—lack of regulation, and therefore perception of increased risk,
online parties use other means to establish trust.121 Online, this
generally manifests in users exchanging names, photos, and other
identifying information.122 The importance of establishing trust
increases when transactions involve services, rather than goods.123
119. Feng Li, Dariusz Pie kowski, Aad van Moorsel & Chris Smith, A Holistic Framework
for Trust in Online Transactions, 14 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 85, 88 (2012) (noting that there are
three broad categories of trust: “(1) inter-personal trust; (2) system trust; and (3) dispositional
trust”).
120. Id. at 87 (“[O]nline transactions also cross cultural, social or regulatory boundaries
more often than their offline counterparts.”).
121. Trust is distinct and separate from reputation:
Trust and reputation in e-commerce are closely related, but not identical,
concepts. Reputation is a public opinion that represents a collective evaluation
of a group regarding the characteristic of an entity or a person.... Trust is a
subjective feeling that the trustee will behave in a certain way according to an
implicit or explicit promise she makes. It is an essential ingredient [in peer to
peer] marketplaces, since two strangers are unlikely to engage in a monetary
transaction without trusting one another.
Eyal Ert, Aliza Fleischer & Nathan Magen, Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy:
The Role of Personal Photos in Airbnb, 55 TOURISM MGMT. 62, 64 (2016).
122. See generally id.
123. See id. at 63.
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Whereas transactions concerning products involve monetary risks,
transactions concerning services include additional risks to personal
safety.124 In the online tourism and travel business context, trust is
one of the most important factors for success.125
The use of photographs and personal information to facilitate
online transactions encourages bias, both implicit and overt, in con-
sumer transactions.126 By encouraging users to share personal
information, platforms expressly invite personal reactions to play a
role in commercial spaces, resulting in economic consequences.
Airbnb uses names and photos as a mechanism to verify users’
identities as well as “to foster an increased sense of personal
contact.”127 Short-term rental platforms are designed to promote
connections between users. These connections are meant to help
users overcome the perceived risks of transacting with individual
actors, rather than regulated corporate vendors.128 As such, short-
term rental platforms such as Airbnb require both hosts and guests
to create profiles, wherein they are encouraged to include their
name, photograph, information about their likes and dislikes, and
even their life motto.129
Empirical research on the effect of host photos on perceived
trustworthiness “found that the level of hosts’ trustworthiness,
mainly as inferred from their photos, affects listings’ prices and
probability of being chosen, even when all listing information is
124. Id.; see, e.g., Shivani Vora, Airbnb Sued by Guest Who Says a Host Sexually Assaulted
Her, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/travel/airbnb-lawsuit-
host-sexual-assault.html [https://perma.cc/7MS2-9ARR] (describing a lawsuit filed by an
Airbnb guest after she was allegedly sexually assaulted by a host during a short-term rental
stay booked on Airbnb).
125. Myung-Ja Kim, Namho Chung & Choong-Ki Lee, The Effect of Perceived Trust on
Electronic Commerce: Shopping Online for Tourism Products and Services in South Korea, 32
TOURISM MGMT. 256, 257 (2011).
126. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Intimacy and Equality in the Sharing Economy, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 459, 460 (Nestor M. Davidson,
Michèle Finck & John J. Infranca eds., 2018) (“Intimacy in the market tends to breed
discrimination.”).
127. Ert et al., supra note 121, at 62-63; Daniel Guttentag, Airbnb: Disruptive Innovation
and the Rise of an Informal Tourism Accommodation Sector, 18 CURRENT ISSUES TOURISM
1192, 1195-96 (2015).
128. Venoo Kakar, Joel Voelz, Julia Wu & Julisa Franco, The Visible Host: Does Race Guide
Airbnb Rental Rates in San Francisco?, 40 J. HOUS. ECON. 25, 28 (2018).
129. See Why Do I Need to Have an Airbnb Profile?, supra note 117.
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controlled.”130 This means that when listing characteristics—such
as location, square footage, and amenities—are equal, the listing
with the host that is perceived to be more trustworthy will be
selected.131 Moreover, the same study found that the host photo
remains a significant factor even when review scores are varied,132
which suggests that online reviews are not as important to prospec-
tive guests in booking decisions as trustworthiness, as inferred from
a host’s photograph.133
B. Economic Consequences of Guest Discrimination 
Host photographs may promote trust, but they also allow for user
bias. The information provided by prospective Airbnb hosts and
guests may allow users to forge a “relationship,” but it also provides
opportunities for discrimination that are not possible when booking
accommodation reservations on a hotel website.134 Professor Naomi
Schoenbaum argues that because “sharing-economy transactions ...
merge home and market,” they are “more intimate ... than the
traditional economy.”135 The greater the degree of intimacy, the
more likely that bias—both implicit and overt—affects the transac-
tion.136 Whereas an online hotel booking is made without any
knowledge of, or reference to, the identities of the lodger or hotel
staff, short-term rental hosts and guests have the ability to peruse
personal information of hosts and guests prior to confirming a
reservation. Until October 2018, when Airbnb removed guest in-
formation prior to a confirmed booking, hosts could use information
130. Ert et al., supra note 121, at 71-72.
131. Id. Interestingly, the research found weak evidence to suggest that the hosts perceived
as most trustworthy are attractive and female. Id. at 72.
132. Id. at 64, 69 (noting that online review scores communicate a host’s reputation, while
the photo communicates the host’s trustworthiness).
133. This is consistent with previous studies finding that individuals may trust strangers
with unknown reputations, and that self-interest alone cannot explain the behavior. See, e.g.,
Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut & Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES
& ECON. BEHAV. 122, 137 (1995).
134. See Gold, supra note 18, at 1628.
135. Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1023,
1029 (2016).
136. See id. at 1052. While Schoenbaum specifically analyzes the manifestation of gender
biases, the insights regarding the relationship between intimacy and bias may be applied to
other salient demographic characteristics.
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about a prospective guest, such as their race or gender, in deciding
whether to accept a potential reservation.137 This allowed hosts prior
to 2018 to engage in discrimination against prospective minority
guests.
Empirical research evidenced host discrimination against minor-
ity guests. A Harvard Business School study found that “applica-
tions from guests with distinctively African American names [were]
16 percent less likely to be accepted relative to identical guests with
distinctly white names.”138 The results were consistent across a
variety of factors including sex of the host, whether the property
was shared or unhosted, experience level of the host, diversity of the
neighborhood, and price of the listing.139
While there has been research, discussion, and even policy change
related to discrimination against short-term rental guests, less
attention has been paid to the inverse phenomenon: discrimination
against short-term rental hosts. Discrimination against hosts of
color affects rates of booking and average asking rents on short-term
rental platforms. As mentioned previously, empirical analysis found
that non-Black hosts in New York City140 are able to charge 12
percent more than Black hosts, even when controlling for location,
accommodation characteristics, and quality.141 On average, Black
hosts received $107 per night for every $144 per night received by
a non-Black host.142 These results are echoed by other research
finding that in Oakland and Berkeley, California, Asian hosts
earned 20 percent less than White hosts.143
Empirical research demonstrates that discrimination by short-
term rental guests has an economic effect on hosts. Discrimination
prevents minority hosts from realizing the same pecuniary benefits
from short-term rental platforms as their White counterparts. This
137. See Gold, supra note 18, at 1635-36.
138. Edelman et al., supra note 15, at 1-2 (“To test for discrimination, we conducted a field
experiment in which we inquire about the availability of roughly 6,400 listings on Airbnb
across five cities. Specifically, we create guest accounts that differ by name but are otherwise
identical ... one distinctively African American and the other distinctively white.”).
139. Id. at 2.
140. The study was conducted in 2014, prior to New York City’s enactment of significant
restrictions on listings. See Gold, supra note 18, at 1625.
141. Edelman & Luca, supra note 19, § 1.
142. Id. § 4.2.
143. Wang et al., supra note 21.
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Article offers the term “redliking” to describe the website structures,
features, and underlying systems that allow discrimination against
minority short-term rental hosts and the resulting economic con-
sequences. Redliking allows White hosts to enjoy disproportionate
financial benefits from short-term rental platforms and perpetuates
historic inequality related to housing equity. Redlining functioned
to lock communities of color out of asset-building opportunities and
corresponding increases in wealth. Similarly, redliking is a system
that deprives minority hosts from enjoying important opportunities
to increase wealth through new income streams and increasing the
value of the underlying asset.
Admittedly, redlining, unlike redliking, was perpetuated by state
actors: “[b]ecause the FHA’s appraisal standards included a whites-
only requirement, racial segregation now became an official require-
ment of the federal mortgage insurance program.”144 Through HOLC
maps and the FHA underwriting manual, the federal government
created a structure that prevented minorities from entering large
swaths of the suburban landscape and accumulating wealth and
financial security through homeownership.145 While contemporary
redliking is carried out solely by private market actors, the practice
has an analogous effect. The information included on Airbnb’s
platform, together with the algorithms that control which listings
are displayed and in what order, creates an architecture that directs
greater economic opportunities to White hosts. By soliciting users
to share demographic information, Airbnb facilitates private
discrimination in a way that echoes traditional redlining; both
redliking and redlining create and promote systems that direct
opportunities to Whites and away from minorities. In light of
Airbnb’s growing market share, failure to address redliking will
direct even more wealth to White homeowners, will reinforce
systemic real property barriers affecting minorities, and will
exacerbate the racial wealth gap.
144. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 43, at 64-65.
145. See supra Part I.A.1.
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III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND REDLIKING
Redliking implicates three parties: the host, the prospective
guest, and the short-term rental platform facilitating the exchange.
The applicability of antidiscrimination laws to a discriminatory
action between the parties will turn, in part, on which of these
actors is engaged in the practice. As Professors Bartlett and Gulati
note, “we generally take for granted the right of customers to dis-
criminate when they exercise their buying power.”146 Moreover,
regulating individual short-term rental platform guest actions may
run counter to principles of privacy and individual autonomy.147
“[H]owever undesirable an individual customer’s prejudices may be,
they are prejudices that an individual in a free society has a right
to have.”148 In a free society, asymmetry of discrimination is
possible; the law does not, and should not, dictate where consumers
dine, where customers shop, or with which merchants customers do
business. White customers can favor White businesses for reasons
related to racial bias without legal liability; the law does not force
consumers to patronize minority-owned businesses, even if minority
groups experience outsized economic consequences.
In fact, there may be certain situations in which “customer
discrimination might be considered tolerable, even desirable,
because it helps to reverse historical patterns of discrimination that
subordinate people based on a protected characteristic, like race or
sex.”149 Such instances—for example, the Montgomery bus boycott;
the boycott of White merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi;
146. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 102, at 226.
147. See id. at 227.
148. Id. at 238. But see Florence Wagman Roisman, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 on Racially Discriminatory Donative Transfers, 53 ALA. L. REV. 463, 467 (2002)
(analyzing judicial application of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a)
and 1982, to prohibit most discriminatory private, donative property transfers). While in
theory this may open up the door to prohibit customer discrimination, it would be difficult to
accomplish in practice. Unlike trusts and wills, in which discriminatory intent is written into
the document that facilities the property transfer, consumers do not generally share that they
are making a purchase from a White proprietor because of race. Further, this type of
consumer regulation may have the unintended consequence of undermining boycotts designed
to accomplish social change and buoy minority businesses.
149. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 102, at 242 (“Customers sometimes discriminate by race
or gender, in concert, to promote non-discrimination goals.”).
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contemporary #BuyBlack campaigns; and others—are important to
achieve social change. Likewise, calls for consumers to patronize
minority-owned businesses seek to encourage economic growth in
historically disadvantaged communities.150 As the Supreme Court
recognized, “the practice of persons sharing common views banding
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the
American political process.... [B]y collective effort individuals can
make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be
faint or lost.”151 The protection of personal choice in the market-
place, as well as the social value of collective consumer practices in
certain situations, makes it challenging to regulate individual
behavior.
In contrast, merchants—in this case, short-term rental platform
operators—are easier to regulate. Merchants “are already subject to
many state obligations and regulations in exchange for the privilege
of doing business in the state; and they have owners and managers
who can be held accountable.”152 Because merchants are motivated
by profit, they are incentivized “to identify and eliminate potential
inefficiencies within their organizations, including discrimina-
tion.”153 Likewise, there is legal momentum to limit immunity for
intermediaries that substantially contribute to otherwise prohibit-
ed conduct.154 Evidentiary requirements also make it easier to bring
action against platform operators, rather than individual guests.
Whereas direct evidence would be necessary to prove a guest’s
actions were based on discriminatory intent, circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to prove operator liability.155
150. See, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, How to Help a Black-Owned Business on #BlackoutDay2020,
CNN (July 7, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/success/blackoutday2020-
support-black-owned-businesses/index.html [https://perma.cc/VCP3-SPTM].
151. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
152. Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 102, at 228-29.
153. Id. at 229.
154. E.g., Lavi, supra note 28, at 85 (citing Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The
Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401,
419 (2017)).
155. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. Practically, it is difficult to regulate dis-
crimination by individual customers on a short-term rental platform. Short of direct
evidence— for example, discriminatory statements by prospective guests—it would be difficult
to prove that prejudice was a motivating factor in an individual guest’s booking decision.
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Much of the existing scholarship around platform liability for user
discrimination concerns discrimination directed at prospective
guests. This analysis adapts existing legal frameworks, those that
were originally enacted to combat redlining and discrimination
against minority consumers in brick-and-mortar establishments, for
use in online transactions.
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) rendered it unlawful “[t]o
refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”156 In doing so, the
FHA “banned racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing
... [and] expressly banned many of the public actions and private
practices that had evolved over the years to deny blacks’ access to
housing.”157 The FHA prevents discrimination against minority
home purchasers and tenants. It generally does not protect land-
lords. As such, it does not provide a basis of recourse for minority
hosts who experience discrimination on short-term rental platforms.
In 1964, Title II of the landmark Civil Rights Act (CRA) outlawed
discrimination in public accommodations. Specifically, the CRA
states: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation ... without discrimi-
nation or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin.”158 Under the CRA, public accommodations include
“any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located
within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent
156. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
157. Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOCIO.F. 571, 575-76,
578 (2015) (“[The FHA] outlawed the refusal to rent or sell to someone because of race; it
prohibited racial discrimination in the terms and conditions of rental or sale; it barred
discrimination in real estate advertising; it banned agents from making untrue statements
about a dwelling’s availability in order to deny access to blacks; and it enjoined real estate
agents from making comments about the race of neighbors or in-movers in order to promote
panic selling. Although the new law applied only to around 80% of the nation’s housing stock,
a Supreme Court decision adjudicated just two months later extended its reach to all housing
in the United States.” (citations omitted)).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
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or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as his residence.”159
This Part examines platform liability for discrimination against
short-term rental guests and the challenges in applying the plain
language of the law to discrimination against short-term rental
hosts. The application of the CRA to instances of discrimination
against short-term rental hosts is complicated by the fact that short-
term rental platforms serve a different purpose and provide
different services to hosts and guests. In light of the platform’s dual
role, this Part proposes two approaches—a general-function test and
a fragmented-function test—to determine the applicability of the
CRA to short-term rental platforms. Finally, this Part discusses
remedies under state antidiscrimination law.
A. Platform Liability for Discrimination Against Short-Term
Rental Guests 
Federal law generally prohibits discrimination against minority
guests on short-term rental platforms. However, whether the par-
ticular listing is hosted or unhosted will determine the cause of
action available to the affected guest.160 Hosted listings—those in
which the host lists a spare room or couch in the residence occupied
by the host—are properly governed by the FHA. Under the FHA,
landlords cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin when renting out a
dwelling.161 Dwelling is narrowly defined as any part of a building
or structure to be occupied as a “residence.”162 However, the FHA
provides for the “Mrs. Murphy exemption.”163 Under this rule,
dwellings intended to be occupied by four or fewer families are
159. Id. § 2000a(b)(1).
160. Gold, supra note 18, at 1610-11.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (“It shall be unlawful ... [t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin.”).
162. Id. § 3602(b).
163. For a discussion of the history, legacy, and effect of the Mrs. Murphy exemption, see
generally James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy
Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605 (1999); in contrast, the
Civil Rights Act has no such exemption.
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exempt if the owner lives in one of the units.164 This exemption
effectively allows landlords of owner-occupied dwellings to discrimi-
nate when selecting tenants.165 Hosted accommodations fall into the
“Mrs. Murphy” exemption, thereby allowing some hosts to legally
select guests for reasons having to do with bias.166 The FHA also
exempts single family homes rented by an owner if the owner “does
not own more than three such single-family houses at any one time”
and the owner does not engage the services of a broker or agent.167
In contrast, unhosted properties are the equivalent of hotel
rooms, not dwellings, and are correctly viewed as public accommo-
dations pursuant to the CRA.168 Title II of the CRA entitles all
persons “to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation.”169 The CRA is expansive in its view of a
public accommodation. Under Title II, a public accommodation
164. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2).
165. Walsh, supra note 163, at 606.
166. See generally Hayat, supra note 27 (discussing the applicability of the Mrs. Murphy
exception to Airbnb hosts and arguing that Title II should apply in most cases). Note, though,
that the FHA prohibits Mrs. Murphy from engaging in discriminatory advertising. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (“Provided further, That after December 31, 1969, the sale or
rental of any such single-family house shall be excepted from the application of this
subchapter only if such house is sold or rented (A) without the use in any manner of the sales
or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman,
or of such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings,
or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or person and (B) without
the publication, posting or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice [that
expresses discriminatory intent].”).
168. Gold, supra note 18, at 1635 (“[L]awmakers must categorize unhosted Airbnb listings
as public accommodations under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”); Leong & Belzer, supra
note 27, at 1301 (“Like the public accommodations traditionally covered by Title II of the Civil
Rights Act, [platform economy businesses] are held out as open to the public, so ensuring that
such entities do not engage in race discrimination comports with the purpose of that
legislation.... Finally, the analogous precedent from the disability arena favors a conclusion
that [platform economy businesses] are public accommodations.”); Hayat, supra note 27, at
615-16 (arguing that rather than “expos[ing] a ‘soft spot’ in our discrimination laws where
Title II may be eluded.... Title II is applicable to the sharing economy presently and that the
Mrs. Murphy exception is inapplicable to a large number of hosts”).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
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may fall into one of several categories, including those that provide
lodging,170 food,171 or entertainment.172 When examining whether
short-term rental platforms such as Airbnb are public accommo-
dations under Title II, many scholars have focused on the law’s lodg-
ing provision.173 Under this category, “any inn, hotel, motel, or other
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests”174 is a
public accommodation. Because short-term rental platforms func-
tion like an inn, hotel, or motel, and provide lodging to transient
guests, they are properly viewed as a public accommodation under
the CRA.
Categorizing a short-term rental accommodation as a public
accommodation under the CRA is only the first step to determine
liability for discrimination against guests. After this, the question
becomes whether the platform provider itself—for example, Airbnb,
VRBO, or Homeaway—is liable for discrimination against guests.
Professor Norrinda Brown Hayat as well as Nancy Leong and Aaron
Belzer argue that platform operators themselves could face liability
for discrimination perpetuated by hosts against minority guests if
the platform operator knew that its policies contributed to or facil-
itated the discrimination.175 Hayat’s work examines the history of
Title II, notes the limited application of the Mrs. Murphy exemption
to short-term rental accommodations, and details the regulation of
landlords under both the FHA and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) in supporting application of the CRA to short-term
rental hosts.176 Leong and Belzer analyze two issues to determine
that platform economy businesses, such as Airbnb, are public ac-
commodations and that the platform operators themselves are
170. Id. § 2000a(b)(1) (governing “any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishment as his residence”).
171. Id. § 2000a(b)(2) (governing “any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the prem-
ises”).
172. Id. § 2000a(b)(3) (governing “any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports
arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment”).
173. See, e.g., Leong & Belzer, supra note 27, at 1297; Hayat, supra note 27, at 615-16.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (emphasis added).
175. Hayat, supra note 27, at 615-16; Leong & Belzer, supra note 27, at 1311-12.
176. Hayat, supra note 27.
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responsible.177 First, they note that such platforms “are displacing
and replacing businesses that are subject to” the CRA.178 Second,
given that the platforms are public accommodations, the controlling
businesses are therefore public accommodations.179
The Oregon courts were the first to examine this issue. In March
2017, Patricia Harrington filed a case against Airbnb in Multnomah
County, Oregon, Circuit Court.180 Harrington’s complaint alleged
that “discriminatory Airbnb hosts regularly take advantage of
Airbnb’s booking policies to deny booking requests from prospective
guests on account of protected characteristics, including race, in
violation of Oregon’s statutory prohibition of unlawful discrimina-
tion in public accommodations.”181 In support of her claim, Harring-
ton cited Airbnb’s requirement that all users, both hosts and guests,
create a profile that includes the user’s photo and full name, among
other information.182 Some hosts may opt into Airbnb’s Instant Book
feature, which allows guests to immediately book and confirm an
177. Leong & Belzer, supra note 27, at 1298-99.
178. Id. at 1298 (“[Platform economy businesses] should be considered subject to Title II
simply because they are displacing and replacing businesses that are subject to Title II, and
because, from the perspective of the consumer, they fulfill exactly the same needs as
traditional businesses that are in fact subject to Title II.”).
179. Id. at 1299 (“Because these platforms are public accommodations within the meaning
of Title II, so are the businesses, and individuals must be able to access both the platforms
and the services those platforms provide.” (footnote omitted)).
180. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2017 WL 3392496, at *1 (D. Or. July
21, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-cv-00558, 2017 WL 3391645 (D. Or.
Aug. 7, 2017); see also Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (D. Or. 2018)
(“Before filing this lawsuit, Ms. Harrington wrote a letter to Airbnb requesting that it change
its policies so that all accommodations on its online platform may be available to all
prospective guests regardless of race or color. Ms. Harrington specifically asked Airbnb to
change its policy that allows a host to wait to confirm a booking until after the host has seen
the full name and photograph of a prospective guest. She expressly asked Airbnb not to
provide information to hosts before accepting a reservation or confirming a booking from a
prospective guest that would reveal statutorily-protected immutable characteristics, like race.
Airbnb denied the request to change its policy, but offered to assist Ms. Harrington in
securing alternative accommodations if she ever were discriminated against by an Airbnb
host. Airbnb also promised to investigate any reported claims of racial discrimination and
take appropriate action.”).
181. Harrington, 2017 WL 3392496, at *1.
182. Id.
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accommodation, without prior approval from the host.183 This
function is similar to booking with a traditional hotel.
However, hosts are not compelled to participate in Instant Book.
If a host has not opted into Instant Book, a prospective guest must
request to stay in the host’s accommodation.184 After receiving such
a request, the host can confirm, reject, or ignore the request.185 If the
host rejects or ignores the request, the guest cannot book the
accommodation.186 This means that, under Airbnb’s current booking
policy, hosts have the ability to reject or ignore a prospective guest’s
request to book after viewing the guest’s name and photograph.
Harrington’s complaint alleged that “discriminatory hosts use
Airbnb’s booking policies to deny African-Americans access to
accommodations.”187 As such, Harrington argued that “Airbnb is
directly liable for discrimination because its policies directly act to
deny African-Americans full and equal accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of a place of public accommoda-
tion.”188 Harrington alleged that these policies violated Oregon law
prohibiting discrimination in a place of public accommodation189 “on
behalf of ‘[a]ll African-American residents of Oregon who are not
currently, and have never been, members of Airbnb.’”190 Under
Oregon law, public accommodation is defined as “[a]ny place or
service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings,
amusements, transportation or otherwise.”191 Oregon’s statute is
183. See What Is Instant Book?, AIRBNB HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/
523/what-is-instant-book [https://perma.cc/P2C2-DUUM] (“Instant Book listings don’t require
approval from the host before they can be booked. Instead, guests can just choose their travel
dates, book, and discuss check-in plans with the host.”).
184. Harrington, 2017 WL 3392496, at *1.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at *2.
188. Id.
189. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403(1), (3) (2020) (“Except as provided in subsection (2) of this
section, all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation,
without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age.... It is an unlawful practice for any
person to deny full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any
place of public accommodation in violation of this section.”).
190. Harrington, 2017 WL 3392496, at *2 (alteration in original).
191. § 659A.400(1)(a).
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more inclusive than federal law, which is narrowly tailored to only
include places of lodging, dining, and amusements.192 However,
Harrington’s complaint was rooted in Airbnb’s provision of lodging
services, rather than “[a]ny place ... offering ... advantages, facilities
or privileges,”193 including both goods and services.194 Therefore,
even though Harrington brought this action under Oregon law, the
same argument could be made under the CRA.
Airbnb’s booking process differs from that of traditional public
accommodations. As Harrington noted, “traditional hotels and bed
and breakfasts” as well as “restaurants, do not ‘approve’ guests by
reviewing a prospective guest’s name and photograph and making
a booking decision on that information.”195 In this way, Airbnb hosts
have the ability “to deny public accommodations to would-be guests
based on immutable protected characteristics ... in violation of the
law.”196 While Airbnb acknowledged discrimination on its platform,
it maintained that its policy of allowing hosts to view photographs
and names of prospective guests prior to booking “allows a host to
conclude that a guest is ‘reliable, authentic, and committed to the
spirit of Airbnb.’”197
On appeal, and after removal to federal court, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon noted that “Airbnb is aware
that some hosts refuse to rent accommodations to prospective guests
on the basis of race or color. Airbnb is also aware that African-
Americans are less likely to be confirmed for booking as guests on
Airbnb’s online platform than are persons who are not African-
Americans.”198 As a result of discriminatory practices by some
Airbnb hosts, “African-Americans ... do not have full and equal
access to the accommodations and services offered on Airbnb’s on-
line platform.”199 The court was similarly unmoved by Airbnb’s claim
that it did not personally operate the individual listings nor make
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
193. § 659A.400(1)(a).
194. See Harrington, 2017 WL 3392496, at *2.
195. Plaintiff ’s Motion to Remand at 3, Harrington, No. 3:17-CV-00558-YY, 2017 WL
11048581 (D. Or. May 5, 2017).
196. Id. at 2.
197. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (D. Or. 2018).
198. Id. at 1087.
199. Id.
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decisions about whether to accept individual guests. As the court
noted, “[i]t is irrelevant that Airbnb does not itself directly rent or
own the accommodations being rented out because what Airbnb
provides to the public is the service of using its online platform to
browse, locate, book, and pay for accommodations in private
homes.”200 As a result, the court concluded that Ms. Harrington
established a prima facie case.201
In ruling against Airbnb’s motion to dismiss Ms. Harrington’s
claim, the court noted that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of discriminatory intent.202 Airbnb “devised and
chose to maintain its mandatory photograph policy, even after
Airbnb became aware that its policy was leading to racial discrimi-
nation on its platform.”203 As such, the complaint “sufficiently
plead[ed] that Airbnb intentionally makes many of the accommoda-
tions listed on its online platform unavailable to [Ms. Harrington]
and others on account of their race by maintaining policies that
enable hosts to refuse service to prospective guests who are African-
American.”204
After the legal challenge to its booking practices, Airbnb elimi-
nated the ability of hosts to request prospective guests’ photographs
prior to confirming a booking. On October 22, 2018, Airbnb an-
nounced that “[m]oving forward, rather than displaying a potential
guest’s profile photo before the booking is accepted, hosts will
receive a guest’s photo in the booking process only after they’ve
accepted the booking request.”205 Moreover, if a host cancels a
200. Id. at 1093.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 1089-91 (citing Lindsey v. STL L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 (9th Cir.
2006)) (“[W]hile direct evidence of racial discrimination could support a finding of discrimi-
natory intent, it is not required, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient.”).
203. Id. at 1090.
204. Id. (“African-Americans do not have full and equal access to all the accommodations
on the Airbnb online platform to which persons who are not African-Americans have access.”).
Ms. Harrington alleged
that when Airbnb repeatedly reaffirmed and recommitted to its mandatory
photograph policy, Airbnb made a calculated decision that it was not only willing
to tolerate racial discrimination on its online platform rather than risk losing
potential hosts and potential revenues, but it was also intentionally enabling,
and thus furthering, racial discrimination.
Id.
205. Update on Profile Photos, supra note 17.
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booking after the guest shares a photo, the platform will provide the
guest with “an easy way to contact Airbnb and report any concerns
about potential discrimination by the host.”206 Further, as Ms.
Harrington requested in her complaint, Airbnb will no longer
require all guests to include a photograph.207
Harrington and Airbnb’s reaction are significant to challenge
redliking for multiple reasons. First, the case signals judicial will-
ingness to consider the application of the CRA to online platforms,
opening up potential avenues of relief for short-term rental hosts.
Second, Airbnb’s changes to its platform design and booking process
demonstrate that it is possible to facilitate successful transactions
while eliminating pathways for user bias. Moreover, the change
signals that any additional trust that may be gained by sharing
demographic information prior to booking confirmation is out-
weighed by the potential for discrimination.208
B. Distinguishing Guests from Hosts 
The Oregon District Court’s analysis of Airbnb’s liability in
Harrington provides a powerful remedy for guests who experience
discrimination on short-term home platforms. Missing from the
dicta, however, is a discussion of how and whether the CRA applies
to hosts who experience discrimination. Intuition and bedrock
principles underpinning the legal system “suggest that businesses
open to the public have a duty to serve the public without unjust
discrimination. Yet the formal law does not unequivocally reflect
this principle.”209 As enumerated under Title II of the CRA, public
accommodations are limited to restaurants, places of lodging, gas
206. Id.
207. See id. Airbnb characterized this change as a “balance” between guests’ concerns and
hosts’ desires, recognizing that host photographs may “be misused in a way that violates our
nondiscrimination policy.” Id.
208. See id. (“[P]hotos can be a useful tool for enhancing trust and promoting community....
Because some hosts value profile photos and want to be able to know who they can expect at
their front door, we will give hosts the option to ask that guests provide a profile photo prior
to booking, which will only be presented to the host after the host accepts the booking
request.”).
209. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (1996).
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stations, and places of entertainment.210 Conspicuously absent from
this list are retail and other service industries.211 While Sections
1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 may govern retail
establishments,212 public accommodation scholar Professor Joseph
Singer is not optimistic: “[W]e might well conclude that the
assumption that the Supreme Court would necessarily interpret
federal law to prohibit racial discrimination in access to retail stores
constitutes wishful thinking.”213
Many are surprised to learn that the CRA does not expressly bar
discrimination in retail establishments; the list of covered establish-
ments under the CRA conspicuously omits retail institutions.214
Singer argues that both a textual analysis215 and the legislative
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
211. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 3 (2001) (“The nonregulation of retail discrimination seems to be
premised on a vague coterie of assumptions: (1) retail discrimination does not exist because
retailers have no motive to discriminate; (2) retail discrimination does not exist because
competition forces retailers not to discrimination; and (3) any retail discrimination that does
occur does not have serious consequences because of effective counterstrategies by potential
victims.”).
212. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 209, at 1425.
213. Id. at 1289. “Section 1981 grants ‘[a]ll persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens,’ while Section 1982 grants ‘all citizens ... the same
right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to purchase ... personal property.’” Id. at 1288
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted). While the Supreme Court has found that Sections
1981 and 1982 apply to “private conduct of nongovernmental actors[, the Court] has never
held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 constitutes a general public accommodations law.” Id.
at 1288-89 (footnote omitted).
Although the matter is far from certain, there is reason to believe that the
Supreme Court ... might very well not interpret either Sections 1981 or 1982 as
requiring a retail store to admit customers regardless of race.... One obvious
distinction is that the duty to serve the public incumbent on public
accommodations might be conceptualized, not as a right to enter into contracts
or a right to purchase property, but as a right to enter real property possessed
by another—a right not definitively included in either Sections 1981 or 1982.
Id. at 1289 (footnotes omitted).
214. See id. at 1288 (“Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates restaurants,
innkeepers, gas stations, and places of entertainment. Retail stores are not covered. Most
people are surprised, even shocked, to learn this.” (footnote omitted)).
215. Id. at 1413-14 (“If one is a textualist in statutory interpretation, it is an obvious
conclusion that” establishments affecting interstate commerce or supported in their activities
by State action as places of public accommodation; lodgings; facilities principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or
entertainment; and other covered establishments “define[ ] which businesses constitute ‘places
of public accommodation’ regulated by paragraph (a),” which states, all persons shall be
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history “support[ ] the notion that the list was intended to be
exhaustive.”216 The Supreme Court’s recent decision—and perhaps
more importantly, the majority’s textualist reasoning—in Bostock
v. Clayton County,217 may contradict Singer.218 Applying the Bostock
majority’s textualist approach to sections 1981 and 1982 of the CRA
may support a finding that these sections apply to a license to enter
a retail establishment. However, this outcome is far from certain.219
If hosts’ legal recourse remains limited under Sections 1981 and
1982, then hosts will look to Title II of the CRA. The Court may
interpret the CRA to exclude all establishments not explicitly
enumerated in the original text, including retail establishments,
which would, in turn, limit the potential legal recourse available for
hosts who experience discrimination on short-term rental platforms.
While a short-term rental platform functions as an inn or place of
lodging for a guest, a short-term rental platform serves a different
function for hosts.
As discussed above, the liability of short-term rental platforms to
prospective guests is predicated on the recognition that a short-term
rental platform performs the same function as an inn, hotel, motel,
or other establishment that provides lodging to guests within the
meaning of Title II of the CRA. However, while short-term rental
platforms serve a lodging function for guests, they serve a related
but arguably distinct function for hosts. A platform such as Airbnb
does not provide lodging to the host; instead, it provides a host with
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this
section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or
national origin, “especially since the operative provisions in paragraph (a) are limited to
places of public accommodation ‘as defined in this section.’”).
216. Id. at 1416.
217. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
218. Tara Leigh Grove, Comment, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 266-67
(2020) (arguing that there are two types of textualism: (1) “‘formalistic textualism,’ an
approach that instructs interpreters to carefully parse the statutory language, focusing on
semantic context and downplaying policy concerns or the practical ... consequences of the
case,” and (2) “‘flexible textualism,’ an approach that attends to text but permits interpreters
to make sense of that text by considering policy and social context as well as practical
consequences”). Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch adopted what Grove calls
“formalistic textualism” to determine that Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. See id.
219. This is even more uncertain in light of Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s addition to the
Court.
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the opportunity to join a large lodging marketplace, or advertising
forum, that connects the host to prospective guests in search of
accommodation and facilitates booking and payment. In essence, the
host is similar to an innkeeper who is compensating the website in
exchange for the ability to advertise available accommodations and
facilitating payment. The duality of the platform’s role raises ques-
tions about available legal recourse under Title II for hosts who
experience discrimination.
C. Assessing Platform Operator Liability for Discrimination
Against Hosts
Judicial treatment of websites in related contexts is instructive
to understanding how courts may interpret a short-term rental
platform’s dual roles. This Article proposes two approaches courts
may take to regulate operator liability for discrimination experi-
enced by short-term rental hosts on the platform. Based on judicial
interpretation of the ADA, a court may apply a general-function test
to determine the applicability of the CRA to short-term rental
platforms. Alternatively, relying on analysis of website speech under
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), federal courts may apply
a fragmented-function test and conclude that Title II of the CRA
does not provide any recourse for hosts. Were the courts to apply the
fragmented-function test and determine that Title II does not pro-
vide recourse, minority short-term rental hosts may instead look to
state antidiscrimination doctrine to bring action against platform
operators who fail to make changes that would eliminate, or at least
greatly reduce, discrimination on their websites.
1. General-Function Test
Courts may use a general-function test to determine whether a
website qualifies as a public accommodation under the CRA. Under
this approach, the fact-finder would look at the attributes of the
website, and if its primary purpose falls into a category recog-
nized as a public accommodation, then all users would be entitled
to CRA protection. While scarce under the CRA, a growing body of
judicial opinions has considered the application of federal public
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accommodation law to websites under the ADA.220 This line of ADA
public accommodation cases may support the use of a general-
function test when assessing the ability of CRA public accommo-
dation law to protect short-term rental hosts.
In Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, the Ninth Circuit examined the
purpose of a website’s brick and mortar equivalent to determine
whether the online site itself was a public accommodation under the
ADA.221 Under the ADA, “[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation.”222 The court determined
that the ADA “applies to the services of a place of public accommo-
dation, not services in a place of public accommodation.”223 There-
fore, because it provided services available to patrons of physical
Domino’s Pizza restaurants, the website was subject to the require-
ments of the ADA.224
While Robles v. Domino’s involved a website that served the same
function as its companion brick-and-mortar locations, courts have
also examined website liability under the ADA in the absence of a
physical counterpart. In National Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc.,
the United States District Court of Massachusetts considered
whether Netflix, “the leading provider of streaming television and
220. Circuit courts are split on the appropriate test to determine whether a website is
subject to Title III of the ADA. The First and Seventh Circuits have found that online services
are always subject to the ADA, regardless of whether there is any physical storefront. See
Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19-20
(1st Cir. 1994); Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999). And the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have found ADA applicability when there is a nexus between a website
and a physical location. See Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2019);
Haynes v. Dunkin’ Donuts LLC, 741 F. App’x. 752, 754 (11th Cir. 2018). On the other hand,
the Fifth Circuit has found that online services are never subject to the ADA. See generally
Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 2016) (defining place of
public accommodation narrowly as referring to physical establishments); McNeil v. Time Ins.,
205 F.3d 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2000) (interpreting Title III of the ADA to apply to access to place
of accommodation rather than the content of goods and services offered).
221. 913 F.3d 898, 902-05 (9th Cir. 2019).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). This applies to “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.” Id.
223. See Robles, 913 F.3d at 905 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F.
Supp. 2d 946, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2006)).
224. Id. at 905-06.
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movies on the Internet,”225 had an obligation to provide closed cap-
tioning on all of its streaming library pursuant to the ADA.226 In
defending its practice of not providing closed captioning on all of its
streaming library, Netflix asserted that websites in general, and its
website in particular, are not “place[s] of public accommodation”
under the ADA.227 The court rejected this reasoning, recognizing
that “business is increasingly conducted online” and noted that
“‘places of public accommodation’ are not limited to ‘actual physical
structures.’”228 It is irrelevant that the ADA definition of public
accommodation did not, and does not, specifically include web-based
services, as Congress intended the definition of public accommoda-
tion under the ADA “to adapt to changes in technology.”229 As the
court noted, “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who
enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by
mail are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd
result.”230 The court ultimately concluded that Netflix may qualify
as a
“service establishment” in that it provides customers with the
ability to stream video programming through the internet; a
“place of exhibition or entertainment” in that it displays movies,
television programming, and other content; and a “rental
establishment” in that it engages customers to pay for the rental
of video programming.231
While the analysis in both Robles v. Domino’s and National Ass’n for
the Deaf v. Netflix deals with the definition of a public accommoda-
tion under the ADA, the analysis is instructive in interpreting
225. 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 199 (D. Mass. 2012).
226. See id. at 198-99. The plaintiffs further asserted that “captioned films are not
categorized in the same manner as other films, making it impossible for deaf and hard of
hearing individuals to use Netflix’s personalized film recommendations.” Id. at 199.
227. Id. at 199-200.
228. Id. at 200 (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England,
37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
229. Id. at 200-01.
230. Id. at 200 (alteration in original) (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 19)
(“Carparts’s reasoning applies with equal force to services purchased over the Internet, such
as video programming offered through the Watch Instantly web site.”).
231. Id. at 201 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)).
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Airbnb’s status as a public accommodation under the CRA. In both
ADA cases, the courts made clear that operation of a marketplace
online, rather than in a physical space, does not obviate a business’s
responsibilities to consumers.232 As the Netflix court noted,
In a society in which business is increasingly conducted online,
excluding businesses that sell services through the Internet from
the ADA would “run afoul of the purposes of the ADA and would
severely frustrate Congress’s intent that individuals with
disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and
advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the
general public.”233
The same should hold for websites offering activities traditionally
regulated by the CRA. To exclude online transactions, such as short-
term rental accommodation bookings, from the CRA because they
take place entirely on the internet would undermine the purpose of
the CRA.
Critics may point out, rightly, that both Netflix and Robles dealt
with categories of service that were already expressly protected by
the ADA, which is broader than the CRA.234 While the ADA applies
to twelve categories of entities whose “operations ... affect com-
merce,”235 the CRA public accommodation list applies to entities that
provide lodging, food, or entertainment.236 However, as the Netflix
court noted, the “[p]laintiffs must show only that the web site falls
within a general category listed under the ADA.”237 The courts’
232. This reasoning echoes the “holding out theory,” which requires “innkeepers and
carriers of goods to serve the public if they held themselves out to serve the public.” Terri R.
Day & Danielle Weatherby, Contemplating Masterpiece Cakeshop, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 86, 91 (2017).
233. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (quoting Carparts Distrib. Ctr., 37 F.3d at 20).
234. Under the ADA, there are twelve categories of entities whose “operations ... affect
commerce” and therefore qualify as public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L). These
include entities that provide lodging, dining, and entertainment; places of public gathering;
sales or rental establishments; service establishments such as laundromats, dry cleaners,
banks, barber shops, and travel services; stations used for specified public transportation;
museums or places of public display or collection; places of recreation; places of education;
social service center establishments; and places of exercise or recreation. Id.
235. Id. § 12181(7).
236. Id. § 2000a(b).
237. 869 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (emphasis added) (“[W]ithin each of these categories, the
legislation only lists a few examples and then, in most cases, adds the phrase ‘other similar’
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willingness to recognize that contemporary websites fall into a
general category of protected establishments under the ADA sug-
gests that the overarching purpose of the site may be a dominant
factor in determining the applicability of federal protections,
regardless of the type of user.
Applying this analysis to Title II’s definition of public accommo-
dation, a court would look at the general category into which a
short-term rental platform may be grouped. Supporting this
approach, the CRA lodging provision does not require discrimination
to be experienced by the “transient guest[ ].”238 The text states that
“[a]ll persons [are] entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the ...
services ... of any place of public accommodation,”239 suggesting that
protection is instead triggered by the type of establishment. Short-
term rental platforms deal generally with the provision of lodging
services, an enumerated public accommodation. Under this ap-
proach, because a lodging qualifies broadly as a public accommoda-
tion, and because short-term rental platforms provide lodging
services, all persons could seek legal recourse under the CRA for
discrimination that they experience on the platform.
2. Fragmented-Function Test
Alternatively, courts may determine whether a short-term rental
platform is a public accommodation within the meaning of the CRA
based on the specific type of user experience. Both Robles and
Netflix dealt with transactions that involved two parties: the
website owner and the user, with the court affirming the obligations
of the website to the user under ADA public accommodation doc-
trine.240 In the case of short-term rental platforms, there are three
relevant parties: (1) the company operating the website, (2) the
entities. The Committee intends that the ‘other similar’ terminology should be construed
liberally consistent with the intent of the legislation.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 116, at 59 (1990)));
see also Access Now, Inc. v. Blue Apron, LLC, No. 17-cv-116-JL, 2017 WL 5186354, at *4
(D.N.H. Nov. 8, 2017) (finding that Blue Apron may be like an online grocery store, which is
a public accommodation under the ADA, or may fall into the broader “other sales” or “other
service establishment” categories).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1).
239. Id. § 2000a(a).
240. See Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 902-05 (9th Cir. 2019); Netflix, Inc.,
869 F. Supp. 2d at 198, 199-202.
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prospective guest, and (3) the prospective host. Given the additional
user, courts may be willing to analyze specifically what each party
gives and receives in the course of the transaction to determine the
applicability of federal antidiscrimination law.
Under this fragmented-function test, a court may determine that
a platform such as Airbnb is a public accommodation for guests, but
not for hosts. This determination is based on the service each party
receives from the platform. While guests use sites like Airbnb to
identify and book lodgings, hosts use such platforms to advertise
available accommodations and facilitate booking and payment.
Courts’ willingness to parse out the creation and authorship of
speech line-by-line under the CDA could signal judicial willingness
to distinguish short-term rental platform user experiences for the
purposes of the CRA, thereby limiting its applicability and available
relief to hosts. Under section 230 of the CDA, providers of internet
services are immune from liability for content created by third
parties.241 The threshold question in the CDA analysis is whether a
website operator functions as a service provider or a content
provider.242 A site is a service provider “[i]f it passively displays
content that is created entirely by third parties”; in contrast, a site
falls into the latter category if it is “‘responsible, in whole or in part’
for creating or developing” content.243 However, it is also possible for
a site to function as a service provider for some of the information
it displays and a content provider for other information.244
The Ninth Circuit considered this issue when assessing the
liability of Roommates.com, a platform that connects prospective
roommates. Ultimately, the court held that Roommates.com was an
information content provider because the platform asked users to
describe their age, gender, sexual orientation, occupation, and
children and then to answer similar questions about roommate
241. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”).
242. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008).
243. Id. at 1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
244. Id. at 1162-63 (“In passing [the CDA], Congress sought to spare interactive computer
services this grim choice by allowing them to perform some editing on user-generated content
without thereby becoming liable for all defamatory or otherwise unlawful messages that they
didn’t edit or delete.”).
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preferences.245 In doing so, the platform “help[ed] ‘develop’ at least
‘in part’ the information in the profiles.”246 In contrast, the Northern
District of Illinois found no liability for Craigslist.com when its
users posted comments that would otherwise violate the CRA, such
as “NO MINORITIES.”247 As the court noted, Craiglist.com did not
request demographic information or preferences of its users and did
nothing to solicit such statements.248 As such, it was a service pro-
vider rather than a content provider and therefore immune under
the CDA.249
Treatment of website “speech” under the CDA is instructive in
determining whether the CRA is applicable to finding short-term
rental platform liability for discrimination against hosts. At first
blush, it may appear that Airbnb is similar to Roommates.com, as
both sites request specific information from users.250 However, while
Airbnb’s active role as a content provider may be probative of its
responsibility for facilitating discrimination, it does not overcome
the Title II hurdle of finding that the website is a public accommo-
dation for hosts. In fact, both the Roomates.com and Craigslist cases
demonstrate judicial willingness to investigate a website’s relation-
ship with users and parse out the website’s specific role. This
suggests that courts would be likely to engage in a granular analysis
of a website’s function and would investigate what services it
provides to different types of users.
Should the courts take a similar approach to CDA jurisprudence,
it is likely that Title II of the CRA will not apply. For Title II to
apply, the short-term rental platform must function as a public
accommodation.251 If courts bifurcate the website’s functions, then
courts will likely determine that, while a short-term rental platform
functions as a lodging accommodation for guests, the platform
merely functions as an advertising and retail space for hosts. Hosts
245. Id. at 1164, 1169-70.
246. Id. at 1165.
247. Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under the L., Inc., v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681,
685-86, 698-99 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
248. Id. at 698.
249. Id. at 698-99.
250. Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1161-62; see Who Can Host on Airbnb?, AIRBNB HELP
CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/18/who-can-host-onairbnb [https://perma.cc/F3N6-
VKNW].
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b).
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do not use short-term rental platforms to seek lodging services.
Instead, a host uses the site to advertise available accommodations
and facilitate the booking with the guest. Importantly, the purchase
of advertising services does not fall into any of Title II’s narrowly
enumerated public accommodation categories of lodging, dining, or
entertainment.252 Because the service that hosts receive from short-
term rental sites is similar to a retail establishment, and because
retail is not an expressly enumerated public accommodation, Title
II cannot apply. Therefore, if courts used a fragmented-function
approach like that used to determine CDA liability, courts would
find that, for hosts, Title II of the CRA does not apply.
3. State-Level Protections
Courts are more likely to employ a fragmented-function approach
to determine the scope of rights available to short-term rental hosts.
Under this framework, hosts are deemed to receive retail services
from short-term rental platforms, which are not an enumerated
public accommodation under the CRA. In the absence of federal
protection from discrimination in retail establishments, individuals
are subject to protections at the state level.
Not all states have a public accommodation law,253 and even
among those that do, not all include retail establishments.254 Forty-
five states have public accommodation laws for nondisabled
individuals.255 Of those, the vast majority include language that is
broader than that of federal law. In defining a public accommoda-
tion, many states use language such as “all establishments which
252. Id. § 2000a(b).
253. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas do not have public
accommodation statutes for nondisabled individuals. State Public Accommodation Laws,
NCLS (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-
accommodation-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/7FCX-9HE9]. According to the United States
Census Bureau, these states represent more than 17.5 percent of the population. US
States—Ranked by Population 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.
com/states [https://perma.cc/2BFA-NUU9].
254. See Jeremy D. Bayless & Sophie F. Wang, Racism on Aisle Two: A Survey of Federal




2021] REDLIKING: WHEN REDLINING GOES ONLINE 1891
cater or offer their services, facilities or goods to or solicit patronage
from the members of the general public.”256 Similarly, several
jurisdictions define a public accommodation as “any place, store, or
other establishment ... that ... accepts the patronage or trade of the
general public.”257 Other jurisdictions go even further, defining a
public accommodation as “any establishment which ... offers its
services or facilities or goods to the general public”258 or “places to
which the general public is invited.”259 Public accommodation law at
the state level is primarily concerned with whether the business is
open to the general public.
Short-term rental platforms are businesses open to the general
public. Airbnb, for example, states that hosts can “[s]hare any
space” on Airbnb.260 Even short-term rental sites that cater to
affinity groups are open to all.261 If short-term rental platforms ran
their services out of brick-and-mortar locations, there would be no
question that they constitute a public accommodation under state
law. A website offering the same service should be subject to the
same law. To find otherwise would frustrate the purpose of public
accommodation law by creating an “internet loophole.” Websites,
therefore, are not immune from liability under state
256. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441(2) (2020).
257. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(7) (2020).
258. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-63(1) (2020).
259. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 413.08(2)(c) (2019).
260. Rent Out Your House, Apartment or Room on Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://airbnb.com/
host/homes [https://perma.cc/RDP3-4SXS]. The site further states that “[a]lmost anyone can
be a host. It’s free to sign up and list both stays and experiences.... Stays and experiences are
offered all around the world, though we’re required to comply with international regulations
that restrict the use of our site by residents of certain countries.” Who Can Host on Airbnb?,
supra note 250.
261. If a short-term rental platform has an express policy of prohibiting minority hosts
from participating, it would be challenged. Affinity groups can, and do, operate platforms. For
example, Noirbnb.com is a short-term rental platform that was created in response to racism
experienced by minority Airbnb users and caters specifically to “stress-free travel for the
African Diaspora.” NOIRBNB, https://noirbnb.com/ [https://perma.cc/FT2G-8AVF]. However,
the site emphatically states that it is “open to all!” Frequently Asked Questions, NOIRBNB,
https://noirbnb.com/faqs [https://perma.cc/FZ7B-83L2]. Similarly, Innclusive was created in
response to discrimination experienced by minority users on Airbnb. Danielle T. Pointdujour,
Innclusive Founder on Her Plans to Make #AirBnBWhileBlack a Thing of the Past, EBONY
(June 9, 2016), https://www.ebony.com/life/travel-innclusive/ [https://perma.cc/8JPX-YMRL].
Innclusive’s founder touted the platform as an important tool to fight discrimination and
designed Innclusive as a “safe place” for all. Id. Despite its admirable goals, Innclusive no
longer existed when this Article was published.
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antidiscrimination law, nor may they circumvent their obligations
to be free of discrimination just because they only exist online.
Notably, however, five states do not have a public accommodation
statute for nondisabled individuals: Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and Texas.262 According to data from the United
States Census Bureau, these states represent more than 17.5
percent of the population.263 If federal courts apply a fragmented-
function test and determine the CRA does not apply, hosts in these
jurisdictions who experience discrimination will be left without
meaningful legal recourse.
Determining that a short-term rental platform is a public
accommodation for hosts within the meaning of state law is only the
first step to assessing platform operator liability. Hosts must also
prove they experienced discrimination in order to prevail. It is diffi-
cult to prove that any single decision not to book with a space listed
by a minority host is the result of discrimination. However, in ana-
lyzing platform liability, direct evidence is not necessary to succeed
on a CRA claim.264 As the Supreme Court stated, circumstantial
evidence of discrimination is sufficient to infer discrimination.265
However, disparate impact arguments—that is, a showing that a
race neutral policy has a disparate effect on a protected class—are
not permitted under the CRA. As such, empirical data, such as
studies finding discrimination against minority short-term rental
hosts in New York City and Northern California, may be used to
satisfy evidentiary requirements if they demonstrate a platform
intentionally or facially discriminates against minority short-term
rental hosts. This evidentiary hurdle creates the need for additional
avenues to overcome redliking that are not subject to the same
challenges.
262. State Public Accommodation Laws, supra note 253.
263. See US States—Ranked by Population 2020, supra note 253.
264. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (concluding
that the trier of fact can infer employment discrimination from circumstantial evidence).
265. Id. (“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form
of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite
persuasive.”); see also Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
proper procedure ... is to set before the factfinder the task of analyzing the entire record in
order to evaluate the credibility of the reasons proffered, the possibility of other non-
discriminatory reasons, and the ultimate likelihood that the main motive was
discriminatory.”).
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IV. BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
APPROACH
The existing legal framework cannot fully respond to discrimina-
tion against hosts in the sharing economy. At the federal level, the
law was conceived to protect consumers of lodging, restaurant, and
recreation services, rather than merchants or those receiving retail
services.266 This is partly rooted in American traditions of free mar-
ket and individual decision-making.267 The law allows consumers to
be able to shop anywhere and does not dictate that they only
patronize certain institutions, even if shopping at a certain business
achieves a social good.268 Should the courts find the CRA inappli-
cable, it is likely that hosts have no recourse under federal
antidiscrimination law. This will result in state remedies that vary
by jurisdiction. Given the potential barriers to finding home-sharing
platforms legally liable for discrimination against short-term rental
hosts discussed above, this Part proposes nonlegal strategies to
address redliking.
“[S]tructures that promote and preserve” reproduction prefer-
ences of bias and exclusion have “serious implications for social
equality.”269 Online platforms contain built-in design features that
allow users to actualize discriminatory preferences.270 As platforms
gain prominence, both in number of users as well as market share,
design features that permit discriminatory preferences by individ-
uals will have outsize effects in the aggregate.271 Design features
include both the way that information is presented on the platform
as well as underlying algorithms that determine order and rank of
listings.272 Reduction of redliking, therefore, will require a
266. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 102, at 225 (discussing how current federal and state
law does not prevent discrimination by customers).
267. See id. at 238.
268. See id.
269. Hutson et al., supra note 112, at 73:3 (“As others have shown, the intimate sphere has
historically been a crucial locus of state control, as well as a key determinant of social and
economic welfare.”).
270. Id. at 73:4.
271. Id.
272. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 29, at 1652 (“Th[e] combination of visibility and
sociotechnical design confers upon sharing economy firms exquisite control of the interactions
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multifaceted approach that incorporates lessons from behavioral
economics as well as reform of algorithm-driven processes.
A. Behavioral Economics Approach
Given the potential limitations of the current legal framework to
adequately protect hosts from discrimination, behavioral economics
may provide a viable alternative. In the abstract, markets are
impersonal.273 In theory, “[t]here is no particular relation between
a supplier and a demander; that is, a supplier is indifferent about
supplying one demander or another, and vice versa.”274 However,
bias makes such an exchange highly unlikely.275
Coined by Professor Cass Sunstein, choice architecture suggests
that the organization of “the context in which people make deci-
sions” will directly affect the choices people make.276 Short-term
rental platform operators, including Airbnb, Homeaway, and VRBO,
are choice architects. As such, the way they organize information on
their sites affects the booking decisions users make.277 In doing so,
short-term rental “platforms exercise enormous control over the
type of information made available to transacting parties.”278 These
decisions have financial consequences for hosts. Left unchecked, the
cumulative effect of these decisions provides disproportionate eco-
nomic benefits to White hosts. Therefore, it is incumbent on short-
term rental platform operators, as choice architects, to consider
presenting information to users in a way that will diminish the
financial impact of their biases.279
they facilitate.”).
273. Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 91, 94 (1998).
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture, in THE
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428, 428 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (“Doctors
describing the available treatments to patients, human-resource administrators creating and
managing health-care plan enrollment, marketers devising sales strategies, ballot designers
deciding where to put candidate names on a page, parents explaining the educational options
available to a teenager; these are just a few examples of choice architects.”).
277. See id.
278. See Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online
Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1210 (2017).
279. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet, Alexandra van Geen & Max Bazerman, When Performance
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“Defaults are ubiquitous and powerful.”280 They provide an easy
path, deviation from which requires effort and deliberate thought.281
Moreover, “[n]o design choice is neutral: even attempts to cede as
much control as possible to users does not relieve platforms of their
powerful roles in structuring mediated social interactions.”282
Acknowledging the role that design plays in shaping user behavior,
platforms must scrutinize their design to identify and eliminate, or
at least minimize, opportunities for discriminatory behavior.283
On Airbnb, the default structure organizes available listings with
photographs of the property, initially without mention of the host.284
Trumps Gender Bias: Joint vs. Separate Evaluation, 62 MGMT. SCI. 1225, 1225 (2016)
(“Effective mechanisms to decrease the impact of such biases are blind evaluation procedures.
For example, many major orchestras have musicians audition behind a curtain. These
methods have proven to substantially decrease gender discrimination in the selection of
musicians for orchestras.”).
280. Thaler et al., supra note 276, at 430.
281. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 9-10
(2014) (ebook).
282. Hutson et al., supra note 112, at 73:11 (“Claims of neutrality from platforms ignore
the inevitability of their role in shaping interpersonal interactions that can lead to systemic
disadvantage.”).
283. Id.
284. See generally AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/XDA8-SYJJ].
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Figure 2. Sample Results from a Search of “Places to Stay” in
New Orleans285
Once a prospective guest clicks a potential listing to learn more
about the property, however, the site directs the prospective guest
to a page where the host’s photograph and name are prominently
displayed at the top, next to the name of the listing and the nightly
rate. The host’s name and photograph appear before nearly all
information about the property itself, including a description of the
space, amenities, sleeping arrangements, and reviews.
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Figure 3. Individual Page for a Listing in Nashville286
When a prospective guest clicks on the host’s photograph, the
prospective guest is directed to the host’s profile page, on which
hosts can choose what to share with others. This default organiza-
tion encourages guests to consider a host’s demographics when
contemplating making a reservation.
Airbnb and other short-term rental sites should consider how its
design promotes—or at least fails to prevent—redliking by short-
term rental guests. As scholars analyzing discrimination on dating
platforms note, design features can be effective in mitigating user
bias.287 For example, eliminating features that allow users to sort
themselves by race and ethnicity as well as including design
286. See generally Nashville Listing, AIRBNB, https://ww.airbnb.com/rooms/
33719117?source_impression_id=p3_1617372869_9Jn0RRaBOAWSJ%2Fex&guests+1&ad
ults=1 [https://perma.cc/P57U-U8UA]. The badge icon denotes that the host has achieved
“Superhost” status. What Is a Superhost?, AIRBNB HELP CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/828/what-is-a-superhost [https://perma.cc/TN9A-PFEJ] (“Superhosts are experienced
hosts who provide a shining example for other hosts, and extraordinary experiences for their
guests.”). To achieve Superhost status, a host must meet several requirements related to their
services and “[m]aintain[ ] a 4.8 overall rating.” How Do I Become a Superhost?, AIRBNB HELP
CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/829/how-do-i-become-a-superhost [https://perma.
cc/A6RM-D2G5].
287. Hutson et al., supra note 112, at 73:6 (pointing to “search, sort, and filter tools,”
“matching by algorithm,” and “community policies and messaging” as mechanisms to elim-
inate user bias on intimate platforms).
1898 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1841
features that overtly “warn against inappropriate behavior or
promote respect and openness.”288
Firms such as Airbnb that collect user information on a massive
scale are well positioned to analyze their data to uncover bias and
how such bias affects user interaction with listings.289 Airbnb is
aware of the importance of platform design to facilitating, or
preventing, discrimination by users.290 In its 2016 report on its work
to fight discrimination and build inclusion, the company notes that
it is “paying particular attention to the design of our platform and
how it did or did not facilitate fair interactions between people who
do not know one another.”291 Airbnb does not require or ask users to
input data about their race or ethnicity; however, host photographs
serve as a proxy to convey that information.
Airbnb acknowledges that the platform has discrimination
issues.292 Since the report’s publication in 2016, Airbnb has made
changes to the information provided about guests prior to booking
and strategically partnered with the NAACP to increase the number
of minority hosts using the platform.293 More recently, in June 2020,
Airbnb announced Project Lighthouse, an initiative designed in
partnership with civil rights groups294 to “begin[ ] with research to
understand when and where racial discrimination happens on [the]
288. Id. at 73:10.
289. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 29, at 1651-52 (“Rather than draw from a set of known
cognitive limitations, such as propensity to stick with defaults, companies can now use
pattern recognition to spot the many idiosyncratic ways consumers depart from rational
decisionmaking within their digital ecosystem.... Sharing economy firms such as Airbnb, Lyft,
and Uber sit between transactions among multiple parties, which places them in a position
to study both the provider of the service and its consumer, individually and collectively.”).
290. LAURA W. MURPHY, AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND BUILD INCLUSION:




292. Id. at 16.
293. Id. at 15, 17, 25.
294. A New Way We’re Fighting Discrimination on Airbnb, AIRBNB RES. CTR. (Aug. 20,
2020), https://www.airbnb.com/resources/hosting-homes/a/a-new-way-were-fighting-discrim
ination-on-airbnb-201 [https://perma.cc/6CJX-TD73] [hereinafter Airbnb, Fighting Discrim-
ination]. Airbnb partnered with Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Center for Democracy
& Technology, Color of Change, The Leadership Conference on Civil & Human Rights,
LULAC, the NAACP, National Action Network, and Upturn. MURPHY, supra note 290, at 15.
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platform and the effectiveness of policies that fight it.”295 Under this
initiative, Airbnb will research the acceptance gap, which Airbnb
defines as the difference between rates at which hosts accept guests’
reservation requests for guests in different demographic groups.296
Specifically, Project Lighthouse will analyze the acceptance gap rate
between “guests who are perceived to be white and guests who are
perceived to be black within the United States.”297 Airbnb plans to
use the information gathered during Project Lighthouse to “develop
new features and policies that create a more equitable experience on
[the] platform.”298 In developing the project, the platform noted that
“[w]hile profile photos have been removed during the initial booking
process, we’re interested in understanding how profile photos might
impact ... things like cancellations or reviews.”299
These initiatives are important to reduce bias on the platform.
However, they are not designed to uncover and prevent discrimina-
tion expressed by short-term rental guests toward short-term rental
hosts. Moreover, Airbnb has not indicated it has any plans to make
changes to how and when guests may access demographic informa-
tion about hosts. By not including discrimination against short-term
rental hosts in its research initiative or altering its website design
to change when and how host information is accessed, Airbnb
perpetuates an architecture that allows guests to continue to
discriminate against minority hosts, resulting in fewer bookings and
lower earnings as compared to White hosts.
Even if the court does not find Airbnb liable under the CRA, the
company could—and should—make several changes to its website
design to curb discrimination by prospective guests against minority
hosts. The most far-reaching measure Airbnb could take would be
to eliminate the display of personal information entirely. This is
consistent with the changes Airbnb made to limit access to personal
295. Airbnb, Fighting Discrimination, supra note 294.
296. SID BASU, ADAM BLOOMSTON & ANNE DIAZ, AIRBNB, MEASURING DISCREPANCIES IN




298. Airbnb, Fighting Discrimination, supra note 294.
299. Id.
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information about guests.300 As discussed above, Airbnb realized
that the availability of guest photographs prior to confirmation of a
booking resulted in discrimination against minority guests.301
Therefore, as Airbnb did for guest photographs in 2018,302 Airbnb
could eliminate the use of host photographs or withhold hosts’
names and photographs until after a guest has made a reservation.
Doing so would eliminate the ability of bias against minority hosts
to influence a guest’s decision to book a particular accommodation.
Withholding host information may come at a cost. In response to
the global protests following the killing of George Floyd, a wave of
businesses took steps to articulate their alleged support to combat
systemic racism.303 Some companies even created pages on their
websites to direct consumers to Black creators and entrepreneurs.304
Hiding host information would make it impossible for guests to
actively direct their business to minority hosts. To address this
concern, Airbnb could instead make host information prior to
booking optional. This would allow the host to decide whether their
listing page includes any demographic information. Currently, many
professional management companies on Airbnb use a generic
landscape photo or company logo for their host profile picture.
However, mom-and-pop hosts may not realize this is an option and,
due to Airbnb’s emphasis on person-to-person connection, may feel
pressured to use personally identifying information. Airbnb should
clearly communicate that all hosts have the option of using an
impersonal photo as well as let hosts decide not to share any
information. For hosts who choose to withhold all information until
300. See Update on Profile Photos, supra note 17.
301. See MURPHY, supra note 290, at 17.
302. Update on Profile Photos, supra note 17.
303. Shaun R. Harper, Corporations Say They Support Black Lives Matter. Their Employees
Doubt Them.,WASH.POST (June 16, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
2020/06/16/corporations-say-they-support-black-lives-matter-their-employees-doubt-them/
[https://perma.cc/2EB6-NVR2].
304. See, e.g., Black-Owned Etsy Shops, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/featured/blackowned
shops [https://perma.cc/XH9M-45JJ]. Online marketplace Etsy, which allows individuals to
sell vintage and homemade products through “shops,” has set up a page that focuses on
“Black-owned Etsy shops” stating “[w]e believe in showcasing, celebrating, and uplifting the
talents of independent creatives. Discover one-of-a-kind creations from Black sellers in our
community.” Id.
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after a booking is confirmed, Airbnb must offer a page design that
does not emphasize this absence.305
Less drastically, Airbnb could redesign its site to decrease the
prominence of hosts’ personal information. For example, a host’s
name and photograph could appear below all information about the
listing, signaling its diminished importance relative to other infor-
mation displayed about the accommodation. Airbnb could even
restructure information so that, in order to learn about the host, a
prospective guest must click through one or more additional pages.
This would allow guests to form a strong opinion about the listing
before being presented with host information. Alternatively, the
platform could make changes to its design to allow users to opt into
demographic sharing, rather than mandate it. For example, Airbnb
could let hosts decide whether to share demographic information, or
to only share after a reservation is made and accepted.306 The latter
mirrors Airbnb’s current policy on sharing demographic information
of guests.307
In addition to making changes about whether—and how—hosts’
personal information is presented, Airbnb could design its platform
to actively, and repeatedly, communicate its policies on user
discrimination. Currently, a prospective guest can search for accom-
modations on the site without overt reminders about Airbnb’s
antidiscrimination policy.308 When a user conducts a search,
available listings populate the display on the platform. In order to
proactively learn about Airbnb’s antidiscrimination policy, a user
must click on “Terms” located in the bottom left-hand corner.309
305. Twitter uses a conspicuous “egg head” as a default image when a user does not upload
their own photo. See generally TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ [https://perma.cc/39CE-BYRJ].
306. This is similar to the platform and process design of Innclusive, an Airbnb competitor.
How Innclusive Addresses Issues of Discrimination, INNCLUSIVE, https://perma.cc/3J5J-G7DV.
Other platforms use a different approach. Hotels.com, an online booking site for hotels around
the world, offers prospective guests the ability to filter for “gay-friendly hotels,” which are
operated by people from the local LGBTQ economy, and will provide guests with information
about local establishments that cater to the LGBTQ community. What to Expect from a Gay-
Friendly Hotel, HOTELS, https://www. hotels.com/articles/ar015478/gay-rgiendly-hotels-47110/
[https://perma.cc/DDE7-JDV6].
307. It should be noted, however, that diminishing or eliminating a host’s demographic
information “is cynical about the ability to change discriminatory attitudes, and operates by
disabling such attitudes rather than challenging them.” Schoenbaum, supra note 126, at 470.
308. See generally AIRBNB, supra note 284.
309. See, e.g., id.
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Once a user clicks, a pop-up appears giving the user an opportunity
to select a header called “Nondiscrimination Policy.”310
Figure 4. Users Can Scroll to the Bottom of the Page and Select
“Diversity & Belonging” from Beneath the “Community” Head-
ing311
Only after selecting “Diversity & Belonging” can a user obtain
information about Airbnb’s discrimination policy.312 If a guest does
not proactively seek out information about Airbnb’s policy, it is not
until they attempt to book a space that the guest is presented with
“a message asking them to affirmatively certify that they agree”
with Airbnb’s commitment to diversity.313 This is too late. By the
time a guest takes steps to book a particular listing, bias has
already had an opportunity to influence the decision-making
process. For the statement to diminish the effect of bias on the
310. Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms [https://perma.cc/65YZ-
CDC3].
311. See generally AIRBNB, supra note 284.
312. Our Diverse Global Community Makes Airbnb Possible, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.
com/diversity [https://perma.cc/6CZR-497K].
313. MURPHY, supra note 290, at 19 (“We believe that no matter who you are, where you
are from, or where you travel, should be able to belong to the Airbnb community. By joining
this community, you commit to treat all fellow members of this community, regardless of race,
religion, national origin, disability, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation or age, with
respect, and without judgment or bias.”).
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platform, it needs to appear prior to when the decision about which
property to book has been made.
Adoption of these design recommendations by short-term rental
platforms would create a new default structure that reduces oppor-
tunities for discrimination to permeate transactions. This would
mitigate bias that disproportionately harms financial gains of
minority hosts while preserving free choice of individual users.
B. Algorithm-Based Approach
Algorithms have the ability to enhance and multiply the effects
and propensity of redliking. Assessing the role of Airbnb’s algorithm
is a related but distinct issue from choice architecture and behav-
ioral economics. Whereas the behavioral economics approach deals
with how users engage with information as it is presented to them
on short-term rental accommodation platforms, an algorithm or big
data approach is concerned with how and why the platform is
displaying certain information in the first place. The order in which
listings are displayed on Airbnb’s website facilitates prospective
guests’ ability to engage in redliking. This is determined by Airbnb’s
listing algorithm.314
“An algorithm is a sequence of instructions telling a computer
what to do.”315 Algorithms power a multitude of information and
processes including screening decisions, social media news feeds,
search engine results, automated market trading, the display of
advertisements on websites, and the listings a short-term rental
platform presents to prospective guests.316 Generally, algorithms
314. “Algorithms shape users’ online experience by selecting what information to present
in sociotechnical systems.” Motahhare Eslami & Karrie Karahalios, Embracing Seamfulness
and Uncertainty in Designing Around Hidden Algorithms (CHI Uncertainty Workshop, 2017),
http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/papers/Motahhare-CHIWorkshop17-CameraReady.pdf [https://perma.
cc/NY95-2TSV].
315. PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 1 (2015); see also Jacob Brogan, What’s the
Deal with Algorithms?, SLATE (Feb. 2, 2016, 10:29 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/
whats-the-deal-with-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/QQT6-B73V].
316. See Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. Sunstein,
Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 115 (2018) (“Algorithms
can be used to produce predictions of the candidate’s outcomes, such as future performance
after acceptance of a job offer or admission to an academic program.”).
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are initially programmed by people who select parameters that in-
fluence search and display terms.317 However, “[l]earning algorithms
... are algorithms that make other algorithms.”318 Learning algo-
rithms engage in what is commonly referred to as “machine learn-
ing,” the process by which “computers write their own programs.”319
In the business context, learning algorithms allow companies to
implement a system to sort accumulated data to better match
prospective consumer preferences.320
However, as algorithms engage in machine learning, thereby
“effectively programming themselves,” the results can skew from the
original intent, becoming unpredictable to repugnant.321 Empirical
research has identified algorithmic bias in online recruitment
tools,322 word associations,323 online advertisements,324 facial recog-
nition technology,325 and computer programs used to sentence
317. Id. at 117 (“Algorithms do not build themselves. The Achilles’ heel of all algorithms
is the humans who build them and the choices they make about outcomes.... A critical element
of regulating algorithms is regulating humans.”).
318. DOMINGOS, supra note 315, at 6.
319. Id. “Machine learning takes many different forms and goes by many different names:
pattern recognition, statistical modeling, data mining, knowledge discovery, predictive
analytics, data science, adaptive systems, self-organizing systems, and more.” Id. at 8.
320. Id. at 11 (“Learning algorithms are the matchmakers: they find producers and
consumers for each other, cutting through the information overload.... Learn[ing] [algorithms]
are not perfect, and the last step of the decision is usually still for humans to make, but
learn[ing] [algorithms] intelligently reduce the choices to something a human can manage.”).
321. Brogan, supra note 315; ROSENBLAT, supra note 13, at 112 (“Research by computer
scientist Latanya Sweeney found that when African American names, like ‘Darnell,’ were
plugged into Google’s search engine, the site returned advertisements for criminal justice
background checks, evoking the possibility of a connection between anyone with an African
American-associated name and a criminal background. When white-dominant names were
used, like ‘Jill’ or ‘Geoffrey,’ the advertisements served had no connection to criminal
justice.”).
322. Isobel Asher Hamilton, Why It’s Totally Unsurprising that Amazon’s Recruitment AI
Was Biased Against Women, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.business
insider.com/amazon-ai-biased-against-women-no-surprise-sandra-wachter-2018-10 [https://
perma.cc/CV2E-CT25] (“Amazon abandoned a project to build an AI recruitment tool, which
engineers found was discriminating against female candidates.”). 
323. Adam Hadhazy, Biased Bots: Artificial-Intelligence Systems Echo Human Prejudices,
PRINCETON (Apr. 18, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.princeton.edu/news/2017/04/18/biased-
bots-artificial-intelligence-systems-echo-human-prejudices [https://perma.cc/D3A7-PN23]
(finding that a machine-learning algorithm picked up on gender and racial biases through
word associations).
324. See generally Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 56 COMMC’NS.
ASS’N COMPUTING MACH. 44 (2013).
325. Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial Artificial-
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criminal defendants.326 In one particularly egregious case, Google’s
photo identification software identified two images of Black users as
“[g]orillas.”327 In the wake of such incidents, there is heightened at-
tention on how algorithms engaged in machine learning perpetuate
discrimination and racism.328
Machine learning algorithms power the search features on short-
term rental accommodation sites. “[A]lgorithm-driven approaches
promise to simplify the matching process,” but are not without
risk.329 For example, research on the role of algorithms in online
dating platform matches notes that “[t]o the extent that matching
algorithms rely on users’ stated preferences for protected character-
istics, these mechanisms can reify group differences and naturalize
historically fraught decision criteria for selecting romantic part-
ners.”330 Moreover, “users may be unable to determine precisely how
their matches were selected, or why others were deemed incompati-
ble and thus made invisible.”331
According to Airbnb, “[t]he goal of the Airbnb search ranking
algorithm is to help guests find the perfect listing for their trip ...
[looking at] nearly 100 different factors for every listing in every
Intelligence Systems, MITNEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), http://news.mit.edu/2018/study-finds-gender-
skin-type-bias-artificial-intelligence-systems-0212 [https://perma.cc/6AWJ-NM5E] (“Exam-
ination of facial-analysis software shows error rate of 0.8 percent for light-skinned men, 34.7
percent for dark-skinned women.”).
326. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assess
ments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/M2NH-PBAJ] (finding bias in algorithms used
by judges to determine sentencing for criminal defendants).
327. Jacob Brogan, Google Scrambles After Software IDs Photo of Two Black People as
“Gorillas,” SLATE (June 30, 2015, 12:13 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/06/google-s-
image-recognition-software-returns-some-surprisingly-racist-results.html [https://perma.cc/
AF9K-W98H].
328. Ruomeng Cui, Jun Li & Dennis J. Zhang, Reducing Discrimination with Reviews in
the Sharing Economy: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb 1, 2 (Dec. 8, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2882982 [https://perma.cc/KWM3-F83K]
(“As discrimination in the sharing economy has become a well-known issue to the public ...
reducing discrimination has become an important issue in marketplace design and
operations.... [Further], [w]hile there is a burgeoning literature in operations management
that focuses on the design of marketplaces to improve market efficiency ... and social welfare
... discriminatory behavior is often an overlooked factor that hinders effective market
mechanisms.” (citations omitted)).
329. Hutson et al., supra note 112, at 73:9.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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search.”332 Airbnb keeps the “exact list of features” confidential but
generally considers the following categories: guest needs,333 listing
details,334 and trip details.335 Clicks in search results also affect how
a listing is displayed. Clicks in search results refer to whether a
prospective guest selects, or clicks, the listing to learn more infor-
mation.336 Requests from a listing page is a factor that measures
how many guests choose to book a particular listing.337
Airbnb does not expressly solicit data about race when registering
users. On its face, it may seem as though this obviates the role that
algorithms play in allowing, or even perpetuating, discriminatory
practices and racial bias by prospective guests on the platform.338
However, if prospective guest bias affects variables that are used by
the algorithm, such bias provides a latent pathway for Airbnb’s
algorithm to express discrimination.339 For example, Airbnb states
that its search results are informed, at least in part, by guest
reviews and ratings.340 If racial bias affects guest ratings, then
discrimination would affect search results through a ratings proxy.
In fact, research on Uber’s rating system, which allows riders to rate
332. What Factors Determine How My Listing Appears in Search Results?, AIRBNB HELP
CTR., https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/39/what-factors-determine-how-my-listing-appears-
in-search-results [https://perma.cc/F6CY-V587].
333. Id. (“We review factors related to the guest, including where they’re searching from,
their previous trips, which listings they’ve added to their Wish List or clicked on, and more.”).
334. Id. (“We consider things like the number of five-star reviews, price, location of the
listing, if Instant Book is turned on, how quickly the host of the listing responds to requests,
and many other factors.”).
335. Id. (“We note how many guests will be traveling, how long the trip will be, how far in
the future the trip is, if they have set a minimum or a maximum price, and a variety of other
factors.”).
336. Id. (“To ensure that this is fair for our whole host community, we only count clicks
from different guests.”).
337. Id.
338. Kleinberg et al., supra note 316, at 154 (“The use of an algorithm is an alternative way
to try to deal with the bias of human decision-making. To the algorithm, the name on a
resume, race, age, sex, or any other applicant characteristic are candidate predictors like any
other: variable X42. If this variable is not predictive of the outcome, the algorithm will not use
it. And since predicting the outcome is all the algorithm is designed to do, we do not have to
worry about any hidden agenda on the part of the algorithm itself.”).
339. See id. at 137 (“[I]f we see an algorithm that does not include a protected personal
attribute like race in the final model, that does not mean that a correlated proxy for race is
not playing a role. It is worth underlining this point: an algorithm that is formally blind to
race or sex might be using a correlated proxy.”).
340. What Factors Determine How My Listing Appears in Search Results?, supra note 332.
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their drivers, much like Airbnb encourages guests to rate hosts,
found this to be the case.341 Empirical research on Uber driver
ratings suggests that “[c]onsumer-sourced ratings like those used by
Uber are highly likely to be influenced by bias on the basis of factors
like race or ethnicity.”342
Similarly, the placement of a listing within search results—that
is, whether it is first or fiftieth—is affected by how previous
prospective guests interacted with the listing. If a user looks at a
listing and clicks within it, it will appear higher in future searches,
which is more likely to lead to increased bookings and therefore
increased profitability.343 If a prospective guest initially selects a
listing, and then, upon seeing that it is operated by a minority host,
ceases interaction, it will negatively affect how that listing appears
in future searches. This is significant because clicks, on face, appear
race neutral.344 However, if clicks are influenced by prospective
guest bias, that is, if a guest does not engage or click further on a
listing after learning it is operated by a minority host, then it will
create a negative feedback loop whereby the listing is pushed
further down in the search results where it is less likely to be
selected.345
Without knowing more details about Airbnb’s algorithm, such as
the specific variables and their relative weight, it is difficult to know
exactly the degree to which discrimination permeates otherwise
facially neutral variables. The situation does, however, implore
Airbnb and its engineers to interrogate their processes to determine
341. Rosenblat et al., supra note 13, at 263.
342. Id. (“[W]hile appearing outwardly neutral [such ratings] can operate as vehicles
through which consumer bias can adversely impact protected groups.... [Moreover,] [a]
plethora of social science research has established that racial and gender bias commonly
‘creeps into’ ratings of all sorts.”).
343. See What Factors Determine How My Listing Appears in Search Results?, supra note
332.
344. Cf. Hutson et al., supra note 112, at 73:11 (discussing how platforms try to remain
neutral but arguing that truly neutral design choices do not exist).
345. To underscore the point, if bias prevents people from booking, then the listing appears
less prominently in search results, which causes fewer bookings, leading to fewer
opportunities to rent out the space, pushing it further and further down the list. See Nicol
Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best
Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 2019), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-practices-and-policies-
to-reduce-consumer-harms/#footnote-44 [https://perma.cc/L57T-F5U9].
1908 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1841
how bias is affecting search results and subsequent bookings.346
Airbnb states that it “is one of the few companies with a dedicated
product team” working to fight bias and discrimination.347 However,
for now, the changes implemented to combat bias have focused on
adding sections to the platform such as functions to “help users
easily report negative content,” or removing information, such as
“removal of guest profile pictures from the booking process.”348
These are welcome changes to the platform, but they only go so far.
Without scrutiny of the underlying algorithm, variables may con-
tinue to serve as proxies for discrimination, the results of which are
multiplied by the algorithm, resulting in negative economic
questions for minority hosts. This is consistent with calls for com-
panies to conduct algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs). New York
University’s AI Now Institute proposed that entities implement
AIAs to “evaluate the potential detrimental effects of an algorithm
in the same manner as environmental, privacy, data, or human
rights impact statements.”349 Further, as sites such as Airbnb
continue to refine or make changes to their algorithms, they should
include diversity in their designs as well as employ cross-functional
work teams with varied areas of expertise.350 Collaboration can
overcome blind spots of siloed organizations. “Bringing together
experts from various departments, disciplines, and sectors will help
facilitate accountability standards and strategies for mitigating
online biases.”351
346. See id.
347. LAURA W.MURPHY, AIRBNB,THREE YEAR REVIEW—AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIM-
INATION AND BUILD INCLUSION 6 (2019), https://news.airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/
4/2020/07/Airbnb_Work-to-Fight-Discrimination_0331.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M5F-U65X]
(“Product Teams work to improve the website and mobile app for our entire community and
are composed of engineers, data scientists, researchers, and designers.”).
348. Id.
349. Lee et al., supra note 345.
350. See generally DILLON REISMAN, JASON SCHULTZ, KATE CRAWFORD & MEREDITH
WHITTAKER, AI NOW INST., ALGORITHM IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PUBLIC AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5RWZ-W5YC] (discussing the benefits of AIAs and methods to implement them).
351. Lee et al., supra note 345.
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CONCLUSION
This Article adds to the scholarship on the sharing economy by
examining the liability of short-term rental website operators for
discrimination against minority hosts. In doing so, this Article offers
the term redliking to describe the platform structure that allows
user discrimination to prevent minority hosts from realizing the
same economic benefits from the short-term rental market as White
hosts. Like redlining that came before it, redliking contributes to
inequality related to housing equity and exacerbates the racial
wealth gap.
Regulating redliking under federal law, however, is complicated
by the fact that platforms such as Airbnb serve dual roles. While
they provide guests with the ability to book lodging accommoda-
tions, such platforms only offer hosts the ability to advertise
available lodging. Traditional antidiscrimination laws such as the
Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act (CRA) were designed to
eliminate discrimination in the purchase and rental of real property
and abolish racism by entities that offer lodging, dining, and enter-
tainment. However, these laws do not include provisions that
regulate discrimination by consumers. Further, free market prin-
ciples and privacy concerns caution against a regulatory scheme
that mandates which establishments consumers must patronize.
Analysis of website liability under the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Communications Decency Act suggests two approaches
courts may take to determine short-term rental platform operator
liability for redliking under Title II of the CRA. Given the limita-
tions of federal law, eradicating redliking requires a multifaceted
approach that incorporates lessons from behavioral economics and
eliminates the ability of algorithmic systems to operationalize
discrimination.
